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        1 - A Study of Different Levels of Love in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra’s Critique of his View
        Mohsen  Habibi Hossein  Ataie
        The problem of love has attracted the attention of philosophers since the beginning of its dawn. For example, in Greece, particularly in Plato’s works, the types and angles of this problem have been philosophically explored to a large extent. In the world of Islam, the More
        The problem of love has attracted the attention of philosophers since the beginning of its dawn. For example, in Greece, particularly in Plato’s works, the types and angles of this problem have been philosophically explored to a large extent. In the world of Islam, the study of this theme, like other philosophical subjects, has undergone some changes in terms of its meaning and scope. Previously, the word love merely referred to the existence of great passion between two human beings. However, Islamic philosophers have changed it in their works into a vast concept which flows all over the world of being and permeates all existents. Ibn Sina has also paid particular attention to this problem in his works. In his view, any existent enjoys a level of love in accordance with its existential level ranging from hyle, which is pure potency, to the Essence of the Necessary Being, Who is pure perfection. After Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra also dealt with the problem of love. Although he agrees with Ibn Sina regarding the overall flow of love all over the world of being, he considers the existence of life and knowledge to be a prerequisite for the realization of love. The main purpose of the present paper is to describe the different types and levels of love in Ibn Sina’s view. A secondary goal here is to cast a glance at Mulla Sadra’s ideas and criticisms of Ibn Sina in this regard Manuscript profile
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        2 - From God as the Truth to the Principiality of Existence
        Mahmoud  Zera‘atpisheh
        The “principiality of existence” is considered to be a preliminary and fundamental discussion in the Transcendent Philosophy. It is a discussion in which supporting existence versus quiddity has provided the context for ontological philosophizing. This paper aims to sho More
        The “principiality of existence” is considered to be a preliminary and fundamental discussion in the Transcendent Philosophy. It is a discussion in which supporting existence versus quiddity has provided the context for ontological philosophizing. This paper aims to show the root of this issue in a discussion in Ibn Sina’s works in which the attribute of “Truth” is demonstrated for God. A careful study of this discussion and comparing it with the issue of the principiality of existence in the Transcendent Philosophy reveals the profound interaction between them. Undoubtedly, the Qur’anic beliefs of Islamic philosophers have influenced the development of the discussion of God as the Truth in Ibn Sina’s works. The same beliefs have resulted in the expansion of this subject so that it has emerged in the form of an independent discussion entitled the principiality of existence in the Transcendent Philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        3 - A Critical Study and Analysis of Kant’s Ideas concerning the Validity of Categorical Imperative based on Mulla Sadra’s View
        Hossein  Qasemi
        The study of moral propositions and their nature has attracted the attention of philosophers since long ago. Whether these propositions enjoy sufficient flexibility in terms of content is one of the problems discussed in the field of philosophy of ethics. In the West, t More
        The study of moral propositions and their nature has attracted the attention of philosophers since long ago. Whether these propositions enjoy sufficient flexibility in terms of content is one of the problems discussed in the field of philosophy of ethics. In the West, the modern philosopher, Kant, believed that moral propositions should enjoy a categorical nature. In his view, determining moral acts by any factor other than the “moral law” will result in subordinating them to the subjective will. His insistence on the validity of the categorical imperative originates in purifying practical wisdom from all empirical factors such as hedonism, sentimentalism, God’s Will, and intellectual perfection. Moreover, he sought the “end” and “good” in man’s nature. Accordingly, the law of ethics and the objective principle of act are introduced as the bases of the categorical imperative and, as a result, all other factors are invalidated. In other fields of philosophy, particularly, in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the emphasis on the categorical nature of moral judgments is seriously criticized. Mulla Sadra rejects not only Kant’s a priori interpretation of practical reason but also his interpretation of the good and the end. Alongside moral facts, Mulla Sadra speaks of individual and social differences and, as a result, accepts several levels of being in lower realms of human beings. All these plural beings affect the validity of particular and unnecessary judgments and challenge Kant’s categorical ideas. The present paper analyzes Kant’s view of the categorical imperative and, then, criticizes it relying on the philosophical ideas of Mulla Sadra and some of the commentators of Kant. Manuscript profile
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        4 - Love as a Path towards Human Perfection (A Comparison of the Ideas of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra)
        Fateme  Soleimani
        Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, have divided human love into true and virtual types. True love is the same extreme enthusiasm and passion for divine essence and attributes, and virtual love itself is divided into soulish love and animal love. The origin of souli More
        Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, have divided human love into true and virtual types. True love is the same extreme enthusiasm and passion for divine essence and attributes, and virtual love itself is divided into soulish love and animal love. The origin of soulish love is the substantial participation and commensurability of the souls of the lover and the beloved. However, the origin of animal love is physical desire and seeking animal pleasure. Ibn Sina believes that virtual love is one of the elements of the “purification of the inner self”, which is one of the goals of ascetic practice and a way for attaining perfection. Mulla Sadra also maintains that in soulish virtual love, the unity of the lover’s soul with that of the beloved through preference and representing the external beauty of the beloved leads to the lovers’ purification of the soul, so that he becomes ready for accepting the station of being annihilated in God. Accordingly, he says that virtual love is a bridge for attaining true love and, ultimately, human perfection. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Specific Unity or Plurality of Man in Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra
        ‘Abdullah  Salavati
        The specific unity or plurality of man is one of the problems that has often remained a marginal one and taken for granted as a presupposition in traditional philosophy. In the past, most Muslim philosophers defended the specific unity of man. However, the opponents of More
        The specific unity or plurality of man is one of the problems that has often remained a marginal one and taken for granted as a presupposition in traditional philosophy. In the past, most Muslim philosophers defended the specific unity of man. However, the opponents of this idea posed the specific plurality of man using a demonstrative method. Of course, in the works of some of the advocates of the specific unity of man, such as Ibn Sina, there are some pieces of evidence attesting to this theory. This paper discusses and examines the curve of the evolution of the specific plurality and inequality of man with reference to some prominent and influential thinkers such as Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. This curve has undergone some fluctuations in the philosophical and kalami schools of the world of Islam. Nevertheless, the process of its development entails the following theories: specific plurality of man at the level of evidence by Ibn Sina, graded specific unity (unequal equal human beings) by Suhrawardi, and three models of purely ontological and graded specific unity, the quiddative graded specific unity seeking ontological graded specific unity, and quiddative graded specific plurality seeking ontological graded specific unity by Mulla Sadra. It is noted that each of the three-fold Sadrian models exists in two apriori and aposteriori forms. The Sadrian specific plurality, because of its relying on solid supporting principles, having a variety of models, and entailing apriori and aposteriori forms of specific plurality, created a transformed atmosphere of inequality of human beings. In order to demonstrate the substantial difference between this type of plurality and the specific plurality of human beings before Mulla Sadra, the writer has referred to the former as human life-specific model. Manuscript profile
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        6 - A Comparative Approach to Epistemological Sources: From Hillah School (Ibn Abi Jumhur Ihsa’ei) to Isfahan School (Mulla Sadra)
        Reza  Rezazadeh Somayyeh  Monfared
        Ibn Abi Jumhur Ihsa’ei (838 AH) adopted a comparative approach under the influence of Hillah philosophical-kalami school in order to reconcile kalam (Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite), philosophy (Peripatetic and Illuminationist), and Sufism. In this way, he created a distinct More
        Ibn Abi Jumhur Ihsa’ei (838 AH) adopted a comparative approach under the influence of Hillah philosophical-kalami school in order to reconcile kalam (Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite), philosophy (Peripatetic and Illuminationist), and Sufism. In this way, he created a distinct methodology which, after about two centuries, joined the philosophical school of Isfahan. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the similarities and differences between the achievements of three epistemological sources, namely, the intellect, unveiling and revelation, at the heart of the Shi‘ite rational philosophical trends, on the one hand, and the extension of this endeavor to the school of Isfahan (with an explicit emphasis on Sadrian philosophy), on the other hand. In doing so, the authors have initially tried to examine the roles of revelation, heart, and intellect as three important sources in Ihsa’ei’s epistemology and, ultimately, have a brief and comparative study of such roles in Sadrian philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        7 - Historical Development of Approaches to the Problem of Essential Accidents: From Mulla Sadra to Muhaqqiq Rashti
        Moosa Malayeri
        The present paper deals with one of the most important and complicated epistemological problems targeted by Muslim philosophers, that is, determining the referents and realm of essential accidents. The main question here is whether accidents are considered to be essenti More
        The present paper deals with one of the most important and complicated epistemological problems targeted by Muslim philosophers, that is, determining the referents and realm of essential accidents. The main question here is whether accidents are considered to be essential through the more particular. In this historical study, the writer examines the development of the various theories regarding this problem over three centuries (1050-1312 AH) and then reports and evaluates the solutions suggested by four of the most prominent theoreticians of this historical period. To this end, he initially explores Mulla Sadra’s solution, which is based on the necessity of distinguishing between particular accidents and accidents through the more particular. Then he discusses the view of Hossein Khwansari, who, after criticizing Mulla Sadra’s theory and acknowledging its weakness in solving the problem, presents his own theory of juristic preference and consensus in determining territories and setting boundaries between sciences. Later the writer deals with the views of Mulla Mehdi Naraqi, who accepts a part of Mulla Sadra’s theory but solves some parts of the problem using a different method. Naraqi’s method necessitates the screening of sciences and extracting some problems from the domains of related sciences. Finally, the writer focuses on the last character of this period, Mirza Habibullah Rashti. He was a capable fundamentalist who enriched this discussion more than ever before in the light of his own profound insight and increased the accuracy of the technical language used to describe the problem. Although he benefitted from the words of other thinkers, he did not accept the solution of any of the preceding philosophers in its totality. He believed that the scholars working in each field are allowed to discuss the related scientific problems within the borderlines of their own knowledge as long as no specific sciences have been devised for investigating them. This view, as explained in the body of the paper, is quite compatible with the apriori-historical approach to the development of various disciplines. Manuscript profile
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        8 - Plato’s Mathematical Ontology in Islamic and Western Interpretations
        Mohammad Saket Nalkiashari Ali Naqi  Baqershahi
        Mathematics has always been considered to be among certain sciences; however, the objects of mathematical knowledge have continually occupied the minds of mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics. The theory stating that the objects of mathematics consist of a num More
        Mathematics has always been considered to be among certain sciences; however, the objects of mathematical knowledge have continually occupied the minds of mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics. The theory stating that the objects of mathematics consist of a number of certain immaterial and separate affairs which are independent of the world of the human mind and thought has been attributed to Plato, and several realist philosophers who, in spite of all their differences, have been called neo-Platonists. Commentators of Plato have failed in providing any clear and consistent interpretation, whether in terms of ontology or semantics, of his philosophy of mathematics, which has resulted in some misunderstandings in this regard and some ambiguity in his whole philosophy. When completing his PhD dissertation at the University of Bristol, Paul Pritchard presented an interpretation of Plato’s ontology, according to which the objects of mathematics are the same sensible things. Here, the allegory of the divided line has been interpreted differently, and the existing ambiguities have been removed. In this paper, the authors have examined this interpretation and compared it with other interpretations of Plato’s ontology of mathematics. They also refer to its effects on Plato’s philosophy of mathematics in general and reveal that, unlike its traditional interpretation, his philosophy of mathematics does not conflict with Benacerraf’s identification problem. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that, based on Mulla Sadra’s arguments, the theory of Ideas is a completely consistent theory in terms of ontology and, thus, Plato’s philosophy of mathematics is a consistent body of philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        9 - Truth of Man and the True Man in Abulhassan ‘Amiri and Mulla Sadra
        Hassan  Rahbar
        The discussion of man’s existence and his truth and station in the world of creation has always attracted the attention of philosophers as one of the important philosophical issues. Muslim philosophers have also dealt with the problem of man in their discussions. The fu More
        The discussion of man’s existence and his truth and station in the world of creation has always attracted the attention of philosophers as one of the important philosophical issues. Muslim philosophers have also dealt with the problem of man in their discussions. The fundamental point in philosophical anthropology is to speak about the truth of man as a distinct and chosen existent among all others. Abulhassan ‘Amiri Nishaburi, the Iranian Muslim philosopher, is one of the thinkers who has posed certain discussions regarding the truth of man in his philosophical works. As a result, here the writers have compared his views in this regard with those of Mulla Sadra as a distinguished philosopher with some novel theories about the truth of man. In doing so, they have tried to analyze their ideas and reveal their points of agreement and disagreement. Here, their conception of man as a creature of God composed of soul and body, their conception of the soul as the truth of man and, as a result, their opposition to materialistic approaches can be considered to be among their common points. On the other hand, their views concerning the body-soul relationship and its quality can be viewed as their points of difference. Mulla Sadra believes that the body-soul relationship is a necessary and ontological one, and introduces the steam-like spirit as the mediator between the two. Then, by posing the theory of corporeal origination, he provides a more comprehensive theory. Nevertheless, ‘Amiri considers this relationship to be an accidental one and does provide a clear explanation to justify his position in this regard. It is emphasized that both of them conceive of the intellect as one of the levels of the soul, the element distinguishing man from other existents, and the criterion for the truth of man. Manuscript profile
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        10 - Substantiality of the Soul in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra
        Maliheh  Saberi Najafabadi
        One of the important problems of Islamic philosophy is the demonstration of the substantiality of the soul. In spite of their agreement concerning the substantiality of the soul, Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina have some basic disagreements in the interpretation and explanatio More
        One of the important problems of Islamic philosophy is the demonstration of the substantiality of the soul. In spite of their agreement concerning the substantiality of the soul, Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina have some basic disagreements in the interpretation and explanation of this principle. The extent of these disagreements has also stretched to some critical issues such the explanation of the soul, its changes, and its relationship with other faculties, which are the focus of this paper. According to Ibn Sina, possible beings consist of two analytic-rational components, that is, existence and quiddity. He also maintains that the source of the division of categories, under which substance and accident fall, is quiddity itself. The difference between substance and accident also lies in the fact that existence is substance by itself, and existence is accident through the other. Therefore, the soul is an immaterial substance that performs voluntary administrative acts and perceives universal affairs. It has some branches or faculties through which it carries out its acts. In this approach, the differences among human souls, from their highest to lowest levels, are rooted in accidents, and no change occurs in their substance. In Mulla Sadra’s view, too, accident has no independence before substance, thus it is a dependent truth enjoying an existence depending on the other. Nevertheless, based on the principle of the principiality of existence, the criterion for individuation is existence; an existence which underlies the individuation of a subject and is the referent for substance itself and a referent for all accidents. In other words, it is a single existence that is a referent for man with various accidents. The soul is a substance commensurate with existence and enjoys an essential and graded existence the accidents of which are considered to be the grades of this truth. The soul’s faculties are its modes and grades, and the perfections attained by the soul originate in its unity with perceptive forms. Manuscript profile
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        11 - Ibn Miskaway and the Evolution of Species
        Mohammad Nasr Isfahani
        Ahmad Ibn Muhammed Razi known as Ibn Miskaway, the famous philosopher, historian, physician, and literary man of the fifth century, lived in Isfahan during the last years of his life. He passed away in the same city. His ideas regarding theoretical wisdom are gathered i More
        Ahmad Ibn Muhammed Razi known as Ibn Miskaway, the famous philosopher, historian, physician, and literary man of the fifth century, lived in Isfahan during the last years of his life. He passed away in the same city. His ideas regarding theoretical wisdom are gathered in his al-Fawz al-asghar, and those related to his practical wisdom are recorded in the book Tahdhib al-akhlaq. One of Ibn Miskaway’s philosophical ideas is rooted in his belief in the organic connection and unity among the natural existents of the world. He views the corporeal worlds, similar to the spiritual world, as a labyrinth with certain grades that encompass each other and are connected to each other. In fact, he draws a comprehensive map of all these grades. In his view, it seems as if the movement of each moving thing is intelligently directed towards its own totality and everything that agrees with its perfection. This motion is rooted in enthusiasm, in which the lover is the effect of its beloved. He believes that, in order to specify the stages of the prophets’ evolution, it is necessary to clarify the quality of the connection of existents to each other. He argues that God has divided each species into different groups and types through His certain wisdom and prudence. He has also established a vertical order among species so that each is more perfect comparing to the previous one until we come to the last type of the last species. It is at this point that the end of this species is connected to the beginning of the next species. By going through the various stages and levels in this direction, vegetation becomes animal, and animal turns into human being. According to Miskaway, after traversing the levels of biological perfection, man attains spiritual perfection and finally reaches the last level of human perfection, which is prophethood. The prophet, too, is promoted to the level of the next species, which is the intellect or angel. Given the situation of empirical sciences in Ibn Miskaway’s time and the prevailing philosophical school of that time, it seems that his philosophical system was not capable to clarify the theory of perfection from a philosophical standpoint. This was because philosophy did not have the required capacity for explaining such problems yet. This view had been posed before him by Ikhwan al-Safa and also by some of his contemporary thinkers such as Aburayhan Biruni and Ibn Sina with some changes. However, it was Ibn Miskaway’s thoughts that were transferred to later thinkers such as Mulla Sadra, so that he would be able to clarify it philosophically. Perhaps, if Ibn Miskaway had shared the same philosophical principles of Mulla Sadra, he would have been able to explain biologists’ theory of evolution from a philosophical point of view. Manuscript profile
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        12 - A Study of Priority and Posteriority through Substantiality and its Historical Background in Islamic Philosophy
        Saeed Anvari Khadijeh Hashemi Attar
        Priority or posteriority through substantiality or quiddity is considered to be consistent with the theory of the principiality of quiddity, and its application in the system of the principiality of existence has been merely limited to the priority of genus and differen More
        Priority or posteriority through substantiality or quiddity is considered to be consistent with the theory of the principiality of quiddity, and its application in the system of the principiality of existence has been merely limited to the priority of genus and differentia to species. Through explaining the meaning of substantiality and its difference from substance, this paper examines the former term in Islamic philosophy and clarifies its process of development and applications. This term was propounded for the first time in Suhrawardī’s works and, later, Mīr Dāmād distinguished the referents of this kind of priority from those of priority by essence and introduced it as one of the three types of essential priority. Priority through substantiality has several applications in the system of the principiality of quiddity, such as the priority of the causes of the rational consistency (genus and differentia) or external consistency (matter and form) of quiddity to quiddity, the priority of quiddity to its quiddative and ontological concomitants, and the priority of quiddity to existence. After Mullā Ṣadrā, because of the dominance of his theory of the principiality of existence, the referents of priority and posteriority by substantiality decreased and were limited to those which were in conformity with the system of the principiality of existence. In contrast, the other referents of this kind of priority have been considered to be among those of priority and posteriority by truth. Manuscript profile
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        13 - A Comparison of the Views of Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā on Khosravani Perfect Man
        Zahra  Lotfi’ Abdollah  Salavati
        Suhrawardī’s light-oriented philosophy interprets spiritual wayfaring as the intuition of Nūr al-anwār (Light of all lights) within the framework of different levels and luminous realms. Nūr al-anwār illuminates the world and rules a kingdom. It is referred to as khvare More
        Suhrawardī’s light-oriented philosophy interprets spiritual wayfaring as the intuition of Nūr al-anwār (Light of all lights) within the framework of different levels and luminous realms. Nūr al-anwār illuminates the world and rules a kingdom. It is referred to as khvarenah (divine mystical force) in Avesta and as Farr (glory and splendor) in Persian. Farr is a divine gift that makes the individual who is blessed with it worthy of caliphate and kingship. Suhrawardī stipulates that the perfect man, who has been called with names such as Espahbodi Noor, Minavi (spiritual) Lights, Chief of Elements, Avarman Aspahr Angel, and Ravanbakhsh (Soul Giver), enjoys the station of royal glory, kingship, and charisma. He also believes that the highest position belongs to those kings whose existential realm is the locus of a collection of divine lights, glory, and beauty. In fact, they are the manifestation of divine perfection on Earth. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā follows an ontological approach to the features of perfect man. He believes that the perfect man is the all-showing mirror of the Truth and divine names and attributes and maintains that it is their nominal comprehensiveness which makes them worthy of divine vicegerency. Given the different basic principles of light and existence in these two philosophical schools, the present paper mainly aims to provide an answer to the questions of who a perfect man is and what their referents are. Mullā Ṣadrā considers existence to be principial and examines the whole being and place following an ontological approach and, thus, sees a perfect man as an individual who has reached the supreme level of existence and perfect intellectual immateriality. However, Suhrawardī holds that a typical perfect man could be any individual who has reached the level of royal glory and intuition. Manuscript profile
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        14 - A Critique of Innate Ideas in Descartes’ Philosophy Based on Sadrian Principles
        Maryam  Samadieh عبدالرزاق  حسامی فر
        Descartes believed in the existence of innate ideas in human beings. He maintained that the idea of God is the most important of such ideas which He, similar to a dexterous craftsman, has imprinted on our primordial nature (fitrah). The interpreters of Cartesian philoso More
        Descartes believed in the existence of innate ideas in human beings. He maintained that the idea of God is the most important of such ideas which He, similar to a dexterous craftsman, has imprinted on our primordial nature (fitrah). The interpreters of Cartesian philosophy have adopted various methods to interpret the place of innate ideas in Descartes’ philosophy. Based on one of these interpretations, these ideas potentially exist and are present in the soul prior to experiencing them, and their appearance and actuality comes after their sense perception. However, based on another interpretation, the innateness of ideas does not necessarily indicate their permanent presence in the mind as, in this case, no idea can ever be innate. Rather, it means that we are capable of creating such ideas and can perceive their truth through sufficient mental and rational contemplation and needless of the knowledge acquired through the senses. It seems that the first interpretation conforms more to Descartes’ own view as to the potential existence and presence of such ideas. Accordingly, it is inferred that the existence of innate ideas in its Cartesian sense is not consistent with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles because he denies the existence of any kind of concept and judgement prior to experiencing them in the mind. Moreover, based on Sadrian principles, the human soul is a corporeal substance void of any kind of concept and judgement at the beginning of its creation, but it gradually develops through its trans-substantial motion until it reaches the level of intellectual immateriality. Manuscript profile
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        15 - Analytical Study of traversal and cutting movement in the View of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra
        Ahmad Shakibaie Mansur  Imanpour
        Ibn Sina's and Mulla Sadra's use of traversal & cutting movement led to ambiguity in the movement existance. In this research, in order to eliminate this ambiguity, we have addressed the following: One, Ibn Sina's arguments for introducing two definite meanings of motio More
        Ibn Sina's and Mulla Sadra's use of traversal & cutting movement led to ambiguity in the movement existance. In this research, in order to eliminate this ambiguity, we have addressed the following: One, Ibn Sina's arguments for introducing two definite meanings of motion, which are the responses to the bugs inflicted on the existence of motion and the reason for the very nature of motion; His arrangements have been explained in that they are the separation of the first perfection from the second, as well as the separation of the connection from the movement. After answering the problems raised by Ibn Sina's point of view it is clear that Mulla Sadra has succeeded in completing Ibn Sina's method by bringing forward the discussion of the Transcendent Philosophy, but Mulla Sadra has not explicitly proved the existence of a definite existence by justifying it on the basis of the principiality of existence Manuscript profile
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        16 - Dilthey’s Lifeworld, Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy, and the Possibility of Transcendent Human Sciences
        Ali Fathi
        The influential role of Dilthey is unparalled in theories in the field of human sciences. He contrasted methodological hermeneutics with the positivist method of natural sciences and stated that, as all natural sciences share a single method, hermeneutics functions as a More
        The influential role of Dilthey is unparalled in theories in the field of human sciences. He contrasted methodological hermeneutics with the positivist method of natural sciences and stated that, as all natural sciences share a single method, hermeneutics functions as a method employed by all human sciences. Through distinguishing human and natural sciences from each other and in order to emphasize that each enjoys an independent identity and demonstrate that the concerns of the two fields are different from each other, Dilthey stipulated that human sciences deal with the world of life, lived experience, or the same lifeworld. The world of nature is a mechanical one, while the living world or life world is alive and dynamic and, thus, the method of treating it is different from that of natural sciences. Using a comparative method, in this paper the author has tried to use the concept of lifeworld in Dilthey’s philosophy as an incentive to explore Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy. Moreover, relying on some of his philosophical principles, such as the principiality of existence, gradation of existence, and the trans-substantial motion as well as his explanation of the concept of free will, developmental process of the soul, graded unity of the knower and the known, and the theory of t’awīl, the author has discussed the concept of “transcendent life” in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Finally, he has tried to demonstrate how one could explain the necessary conditions for the possibility of “transcendent human sciences” in the light of the above-mentioned principles and concepts. Manuscript profile
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        17 - Foundations of Denying the Trans-Substantial Motion in the Philosophy of Ḥakīm Mullā Rajab‘alī Tabrīzī
        Zeinab Azad Moghaddam Abbas  Javareshkian Seied Morteza  Hoseini Shahrudi
        Mullā Rajab‘alī Tabrīzī was one of the philosophers of Isfahan School of Philosophy and a contemporary of Mullā Ṣadrā. His thoughts, originated in a school which was almost in contrast to Sadrian philosophy, clearly show the strengths and weak points of Islamic philosop More
        Mullā Rajab‘alī Tabrīzī was one of the philosophers of Isfahan School of Philosophy and a contemporary of Mullā Ṣadrā. His thoughts, originated in a school which was almost in contrast to Sadrian philosophy, clearly show the strengths and weak points of Islamic philosophy. The purpose of the present study was to examine the roots of Mullā Rajab‘alī Tabrīzī’s thoughts regarding the trans-substantial motion. Since he believed in the principiality of quiddity as opposed to the principiality of existence, he considered motion to be disconnected and of the type of generation and corruption and maintained that gradual and trans-substantial motion was impossible. In addition to the lack of a subsistent subject and the mortality of the species in the trans-substantial motion, the belief in certain philosophical principles has resulted in the rejection of the trans-substantial motion as a philosophical principle by some philosophers such as Mullā Rajab‘alī Tabrīzī. Manuscript profile
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        18 - Term and Definition Based on Sadrian and Sinan Philosophies
        Narges Vanaei Mansur  Imanpour Sohrab  Haghighat
        The discussion of definition has a particular place in epistemology and sometimes raises a number of complicated problems. One of these problems is the role of differentia in Ibn Sīnā’s epistemological system, which complicates delimiting the definition of things. This More
        The discussion of definition has a particular place in epistemology and sometimes raises a number of complicated problems. One of these problems is the role of differentia in Ibn Sīnā’s epistemological system, which complicates delimiting the definition of things. This has gone beyond the realm of Peripatetic philosophy and affected other philosophers as well so that, when examining the source of this problem and the reasons behind the debates, they sometimes attribute the problem to the philosophical systems they follow. However, each has eventually tried to resolve the issue in a way based on their own philosophical views. Ibn Sīnā had to resort to logical differentia in order to solve the problem though he considers definition under such differentia to be descriptive and its role to be merely the distinction of definiens. Relying on his own philosophical principles and placing differentia among the concomitants of existence, he considered definition based on logical differentia similar to term and, in this way, promoted description to the level of term. Moreover because of the ontological mode which he introduced against the conceptual mode for differentia, he maintained that conceptual knowledge is not sufficient for knowing about the truth. Therefore, while emphasizing and acknowledging presential knowledge, he introduced it as a strategy to be used against Ibn Sīnā’s inability for presenting a term and a solution for the problem. Manuscript profile
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        19 - God’s Will in Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī
        Armin Mansouri Ali Alahbedashti
        The howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is More
        The howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate, compare, and evaluate the views of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī in terms of the semantics, origin, and ontology of God’s Will. Ṭūsī maintains that will is the same as motive, which is the same as knowledge of the goodness of act, and thus believes in God’s essential will as an essential attribute. Mullā Ṣadrā also adds the sameness of love with will to the sameness of the knowledge of goodness of act with act and introduces will as an essential attribute. Moreover, he justifies the Infallible Imam’s narrations regarding the sameness of will with act by changing its meaning from having the intention to perform an act to the making and changing of its level from essence to the level of actual existents. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī views the identity of free will with the knowledge of the best system as a verbal conflict and a merely different denomination. He disagrees with equating free will with any essential attribute (such as love) other than knowledge. Thus he maintains that free will is not an essential attribute but is, rather, abstracted from the level of act and is one of its attributes. He also introduces the essence of an act that occurs in the outside or the presence of perfect cause for the act as its source of abstraction. It seems that ٬Allāmah’s change of ontological view of free will and considering it an actual attribute in justifying rational constraints are more accurate than regarding it as an essential attribute without paying attention to the conceptual difference between free will and knowledge and love, which has been propounded by Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile
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        20 - The Influence of Social Conditions on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Classification of Sciences
        Fatemeh Jamshidi Nasrin Serajipour
        During the Safavid era, at the time of Mullā Ṣadrā and upon the rise of court-jurisprudents and pseudo-mysticism, true sciences such as jurisprudence, philosophy, and gnosis were in seclusion. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a religious scholar who was familiar with the philosophical a More
        During the Safavid era, at the time of Mullā Ṣadrā and upon the rise of court-jurisprudents and pseudo-mysticism, true sciences such as jurisprudence, philosophy, and gnosis were in seclusion. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a religious scholar who was familiar with the philosophical and gnostic ideas before him, tried to eliminate philosophical confusion from the scientific society and oppose this fallacious approach. Hence, he established a new philosophical system in order to bring all previous thoughts together in a consistent manner. In fact, he aimed to clarify the place of true knowledge and the ways of attaining it for society through establishing his own school of philosophy. The classification of sciences is one of the fundamental problems in any philosophical system. However, it is emphasized that each system of philosophy and the collection of its problems are influenced by the social conditions of their time. Similarly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s classification reflects his social concerns and has been developed in response to the social needs of his time and directing them towards true sciences. He has provided a specific classification of sciences in each of the three periods of his scientific life. He followed a peripatetic approach during the first period, an Illuminationist approach during the second one, and a transcendent approach during the third period, which reflected the height of his philosophical maturity. This paper aims to investigate Mullā Ṣadrā’s classification of sciences during each of the three periods of his scientific life and demonstrate how each was influenced by the social conditions of his time, and how each responded to the existing societal needs. Manuscript profile
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        21 - The Question of the Consistency of Intellectual Arguments and Intuition: Evolution of Fundamental Principles
        Ghasem Pourhasan پورحسن
        Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two ration More
        Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two rational and gnostic approaches. This school of philosophy claims to have integrated philosophical and demonstrative aspects of affairs with religious teachings and, specifically, the Imāmīyah Qur’anic-narrative thoughts. All thinkers of the School of Isfahan have comprehensively explained and extended the Imāmīyah ḥadīth or commented on them based the Qur’anic intellectual wisdom. The secretive and allegorical approach to interpretation became prevalent in Ibn Sīnā’s time; however, writing commentaries on ḥadīths and traditional thoughts are among the unique characteristics of the philosophical school of Isfahan. This method has been in use since then, and some of the prominent post-Sadrian philosophers view writing interpretations and comments on Qur’anic verses as an inseparable part of philosophical tradition. Perhaps, the only exception here who has emphasized the distinction between these two fields is ‘Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Nevertheless, the fundamental question here is whether the School of Isfahan, with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical system at its center, represents a philosophical and demonstrative school of thought or depends on religious thought and employs argumentation merely to access previously-established and correct thoughts. Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers have paid attention to this problem and emphasized the consistency of these two methods. The most important questions in this discussion include the following: 1) Is the method of rational argument completely different from the religious method? 2) If they are different, which depends on which? 3) Which is the basis in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy: rational reasoning or defending Sharī‘ah and revealed thoughts? How could rational affairs, which can be verified or rejected, and Shar‘ī teachings, which cannot be rejected, be compatible with each other? Here, the author tries to show that Mullā Ṣadrā’s effort to establish this consistency has not been much successful. In fact, in doing so, he has had to either forget about rational reasoning or interpret the religion rationally to prove their consistency. Manuscript profile
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        22 - From Imaginal Faculty to Imagination: A Review of the Evolution of the Concept of Imagination in the Philosophical Systems of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā
        Ibrahim Bazargani
        Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of More
        Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of Muslim philosophers from Fārābī to Mullā Ṣadrā. It has even been used in responding to some kalāmī inquiries. Since the very beginning, Muslim philosophers have continuously devoted some of their studies to the investigation and explanation of the whatness and howness of the concept of imagination. However, this concept has not remained immune against change and has developed a distinct meaning in each philosophical system. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the three-fold schools of philosophy (Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist philosophy, and the Transcendent Philosophy) have each adopted a particular and different approach to this problem. The present study intends to examine the theories of some great figures of Islamic philosophy regarding the whatness of the faculty of imagination and reveal the existing differences among them. The findings indicate that philosophers’ views of the concept of imagination have not been fixed and similar in the course of history, and each has presented a specific and innovative explanation of this concept in conformity with their own philosophical system. For example, Fārābī considered this faculty to be a material component of the soul, while Mullā Ṣadrā changed it into the world of Ideas. This study was conducted following a descriptive-comparative method using library resources. Manuscript profile
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        23 - Aristotelean Roots of the Soul’s Corporeal Origination in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
        Hamideh  Ansari Hassan Fathi Morteza  Shajari
        Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of More
        Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence. Manuscript profile
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        24 - Historical roots of the theory of substantial movement
        Mansour  Imanpour
        Undoubtedly, the interpretation of the reality of the natural world is considered one of the basic topics of metaphysics and has always been discussed since the beginning of philosophy and mysticism. Based on the theory of essential movement, Mulla Sadra considered the More
        Undoubtedly, the interpretation of the reality of the natural world is considered one of the basic topics of metaphysics and has always been discussed since the beginning of philosophy and mysticism. Based on the theory of essential movement, Mulla Sadra considered the whole world of nature to be equal to movement and becoming and believed that the whole world of nature moves towards the constant world. Now the question is whether this theory is a completely innovative theory or does it have a historical background? The answer of this article with a descriptive-analytical approach is that in ancient Greece, some philosophers believed in the movement of all creatures in the natural world. In the Islamic context, some philosophers believed in the movement in the realm of accidents and rejected the movement of substance with all kinds of disputes and arguments. Another group looked at the world from another point of view and considered the whole universe changeable with a mystical view and with the help of intuitive experiences. Mulla Sadra, using this background and prepared treasure, presented and revised the Essential movement in accordance with his existential philosophy, and by proving it and putting it as a basis for many philosophical issues, he made another plan and based on that, the existence in a macro view is divided into two the changeable and the constant parts. Manuscript profile