• Home
  • Moosa Malayeri
    • List of Articles Moosa Malayeri

      • Open Access Article

        1 - Historical Development of Approaches to the Problem of Essential Accidents: From Mulla Sadra to Muhaqqiq Rashti
        Moosa Malayeri
        The present paper deals with one of the most important and complicated epistemological problems targeted by Muslim philosophers, that is, determining the referents and realm of essential accidents. The main question here is whether accidents are considered to be essenti Full Text
        The present paper deals with one of the most important and complicated epistemological problems targeted by Muslim philosophers, that is, determining the referents and realm of essential accidents. The main question here is whether accidents are considered to be essential through the more particular. In this historical study, the writer examines the development of the various theories regarding this problem over three centuries (1050-1312 AH) and then reports and evaluates the solutions suggested by four of the most prominent theoreticians of this historical period. To this end, he initially explores Mulla Sadra’s solution, which is based on the necessity of distinguishing between particular accidents and accidents through the more particular. Then he discusses the view of Hossein Khwansari, who, after criticizing Mulla Sadra’s theory and acknowledging its weakness in solving the problem, presents his own theory of juristic preference and consensus in determining territories and setting boundaries between sciences. Later the writer deals with the views of Mulla Mehdi Naraqi, who accepts a part of Mulla Sadra’s theory but solves some parts of the problem using a different method. Naraqi’s method necessitates the screening of sciences and extracting some problems from the domains of related sciences. Finally, the writer focuses on the last character of this period, Mirza Habibullah Rashti. He was a capable fundamentalist who enriched this discussion more than ever before in the light of his own profound insight and increased the accuracy of the technical language used to describe the problem. Although he benefitted from the words of other thinkers, he did not accept the solution of any of the preceding philosophers in its totality. He believed that the scholars working in each field are allowed to discuss the related scientific problems within the borderlines of their own knowledge as long as no specific sciences have been devised for investigating them. This view, as explained in the body of the paper, is quite compatible with the apriori-historical approach to the development of various disciplines. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        2 - A Historical Study of the Theory of Induction
        Moosa Malayeri
        This study is intended to provide an answer to the following questions: Does induction generate certain knowledge or tentative conclusions? Is perfect induction possible or impossible? If it is impossible, could the addition of a supplement to imperfect induction result Full Text
        This study is intended to provide an answer to the following questions: Does induction generate certain knowledge or tentative conclusions? Is perfect induction possible or impossible? If it is impossible, could the addition of a supplement to imperfect induction result in certain and absolute judgments? In order to provide some answers to the raised questions, the writer has explored the historical development of the theory of induction and then discussed the theory adopted in this paper. This theory has not undergone many fluctuations in the history of Muslim thinkers’ logical thoughts and can be studied in three historical phases or periods. In the first phase, the greatest player of which was Fārābī and, more than him, Ibn Sīnā, induction was divided into perfect and imperfect types. At the same time, Fārābī explicitly stated that perfect induction is impossible and emphasized that imperfect induction results in uncertain conclusions. In order to compensate for the defects of induction, Ibn Sīnā demonstrated how the conclusions of an imperfect induction can be promoted to the level of an empirical judgment through using a compound syllogism and benefitting from the chance principle so that it would turn into an ensuring and certain conclusion. The main player of the second period is Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. He maintained that imperfect induction does not yield certain results, and what has been interpreted as empirical judgment and placed within the category of certainties and even axioms is not anything more than an analogy. The third phase is characterized by the efforts and ideas of Muhammad Baqir Sadr, who believed that, although imperfect induction results in certain conclusions, the mentioned certainty, in contrast to Ibn Sīnā’s view, does not result from the mediation of a compound syllogism and the chance principle. He, rather, acknowledged that the certainty of inductive judgments arises from a specific feature of human intellect which persuades it to ignore fewer possible instances in the face of numerous possible ones. He calls this kind of certainty subjective certainty. The present paper, after reporting and analyzing the three- fold periods, demonstrates that the only defensible and justifiable standpoint regarding the theory of induction belongs to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and concludes that induction, whether by itself or with the help of a syllogism, yields nothing more than a tentative conclusion. Manuscript Document