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        1 - Editor's NOte
        Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari
        بخش موسوم به «طبیعیات» در فلسفۀ کلاسیک، همواره جزء لاینفک و پیوسته هرگونه پژوهش فلسفی بشمار آمده و مشتمل بر بحثهایی است در زمینۀ جسم و جواهر جسمانی و خواص حیاتی نباتات و حیوانات و انسان، امکان جزء بسیط، ماهیت حرکت و اقسام و خواص آن، حقیقت نفس فلکی و نفس انسانی، فنا یا ب More
        بخش موسوم به «طبیعیات» در فلسفۀ کلاسیک، همواره جزء لاینفک و پیوسته هرگونه پژوهش فلسفی بشمار آمده و مشتمل بر بحثهایی است در زمینۀ جسم و جواهر جسمانی و خواص حیاتی نباتات و حیوانات و انسان، امکان جزء بسیط، ماهیت حرکت و اقسام و خواص آن، حقیقت نفس فلکی و نفس انسانی، فنا یا بقای نفوس و فروعات و شقوق مختلف این مباحث و نیز طب و موضوعات مختلف مربوط به شناخت و ادراک آدمی ذیل عنوان علم‌النفس و برخی عناوین دیگر مرتبط با این مباحث. با آغاز عصر جدید و دستاوردهای نو در عرصۀ مکانیک و طب و نجوم و جغرافیا و جانورشناسی و حتی ریاضیات، بتدریج اعتبار این شاخه از تحقیقات فلسفی مورد چند و چون قرار گرفت و در اواخر قرن هجدهم، از صحنۀ تعلیمات و تحقیقات فلسفی عملاً کنار گذارده شد. این روشن است که مفروضات و اصول موضوعۀ طبیعیات قدیم نمیتوانست در برابر دستاوردهای علم جدید تاب آورد و شواهد تاریخی نیز گواه است که انسان دورۀ جدید به اتکای قدرت و اعتماد بنفس خویش، از انگاره‌های سنتی و جزمی گذشته بکلی روی برتافته بود، از آنرو که حتی بدون مواجهه با اصول و مفروضات علم جدید، مفروضات و نتایج علم کهن بهیچ وجه نمیتوانست با مشاهدات عینی و قطعی تجربی سازگار شود. اما با اینهمه، نکتۀ تاریخی ـ‌و البته تأمل‌برانگیز‌ـ اینست که در این جابجایی و تغییر موقعیت در عرصۀ دانش بشری، آیا هیچ نکته یا عنصری در پیکر طبیعیات قدیم وجود نداشت که بتواند برای انسان عصر جدید بمثابه راهنما و آغازگر جستجویی دوباره تلقی شود؟ گویی کنارگذاردن یکباره و بی‌اعتباری احکام و قضایای علم کهن، تقدیر محتوم و اجتناب‌ناپذیری بود که بایست جای خود را بسرعت به علم جدید میسپرد و صحنه را برای همیشه ترک میکرد. این رخداد معرفتی البته که ثمراتی شگرف داشته و دارد و محل تردید و چند و چون نیست، ولی پرسش مذکور دست‌کم از حیث تاریخ علم ـ‌و حتی جامعه‌شناسی علم‌ـ مورد توجه خواهد بود؛ اینکه چرا پیکره‌یی از دانش با آن طول و عرض، بکلی از اعتبار ساقط شد و نه تنها عالمان و دانشمندان علوم تجربی، بلکه فیلسوفان و حتی متخصصان تاریخ علم نیز نسبت بدان اقبالی نشان نمیدهند؟ این پرسش بمعنای رجوع و مهمتر از آن، تصدیق علم ماقبل مدرن و دعوت به فراگیری مجدد آن نیست، بلکه دعوت به تأمل در یک فراشد و دگرگونی تاریخی است که مستقیماً با درک و دریافت بشر از عالم درون و برون او داشته و بیتردید محدود و مقید به تبیینهای میدانی و آماری نمیشود. از یکسو، اتصال و پیوند طبیعیات با دو قلمرو ریاضیات و الهیات در فلسفۀ کلاسیک نیز میتواند محل پرسش واقع شود، از آنرو که برای نمونه، نوع دریافت هندسی و عددی قدما از نظم عالم، مستقیماً بر تبیینها و انگاره‌های طبیعت‌شناسانۀ آنان اثر گذارده و از سوی دیگر، برداشت الهیاتی و کلامی آنان را نیز متأثر میساخت. مسلم است که توجه اخیر برخی دانشمندان و فیلسوفان به ریاضیات و طبیعیات کهن نه از سر تفنن و فضل‌فروشی، بلکه از سر نوعی تعمق و حتی نیاز بوده و هست؛ صرفنظر از اینکه با انگاره‌ها و دعاوی آنان موافقت یا مخالفت شود. با این وصف، اعتبارسنجی قضایای مربوط به طبیعیات قدیم، محدود به ملاکها و قضایای تجربی نیست و باز شدن پرونده این بخش از تلاشهای علمی بشر، احتمالاً امکان بازخوانی و بازشناسی برخی عرصه‌های مربوط به مبادی فلسفی و نظری در این زمینه را فراهم خواهد ساخت و میتوان انتظار داشت که ظرفیتهایی جدید از دل این بازخوانی برای اهل فلسفه سربرآورد. سردبير Manuscript profile
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        2 - Husserl’s Philosophical-Historical Narration of the Origin of Psychologism and the Necessity of Transcendental Turn
        Ali Fathi
        In the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl has tried to disclose the origin of psychologism in the history of modern philosophy. Phenomenological psychology not only provides a basis for empirical psychology but can also function as an More
        In the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl has tried to disclose the origin of psychologism in the history of modern philosophy. Phenomenological psychology not only provides a basis for empirical psychology but can also function as an introduction to transcendental phenomenology. In his philosophical narration of the historical development of the concept of psychologism, Husserl refers to John Locke and states that Barkley and Hume advocated Locke’s views. Locke’s psychological studies come at the service of transcendental concept, which had been formulated by Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy for the first time. In his view, metaphysics can show that the whole reality of the world and everything that exists is nothing more than our cognitive acts. It is at this point that it is necessary to pay attention to transcendental affairs. Descartes’ methodological skepticism was the first method used for posing the transcendental subject, and his description of cogito ergo (I think) provided the first conceptual formulation for it. John Locke replaced the pure transcendental mind of Descartes with the human mind. Nevertheless, he continued his study of the human mind through intrinsic experience because of an unconscious transcendental-philosophical concern. However, knowingly or unknowingly, he fell in the trap of psychologism. Following a historical and, in a way, completely philosophical approach, Husserl showed how the rays of attention to transcendental affairs emerged for the first time in Cartesian philosophy and, then, in the conflict between rationalism and empiricism. He also demonstrated how, after the growth of this attention in Kantian transcendental philosophy, it came to fruition in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Historical Background of the Theory of Immutability of Change in the Problem of the Relation of the Changing to the Immutable
        Mahdi Assadi
        In Sadrian philosophy the change in motion is the same as its immutability, which justifies the relationship between the changing to the immutable. The question here is whether the theory of immutability of change had any supporters before Mullā Ṣadrā. The main purpose More
        In Sadrian philosophy the change in motion is the same as its immutability, which justifies the relationship between the changing to the immutable. The question here is whether the theory of immutability of change had any supporters before Mullā Ṣadrā. The main purpose of this study is to provide an appropriate response to this question. This theory has been criticized by Muslim thinkers and philosophers for a very long time. Therefore, this paper provides a discussion of the most important of such criticisms based on available evidence. Some scholars have attributed the theory of immutability of change to early philosophers in order to solve the problem of the relation of the changing to the immutable and support their own views, which does not seem to be based on solid evidence. Prior to Mullā Ṣadrā, some philosophers maintained that the heavenly sphere enjoys continuity and fixity in its evolution; however, this cannot be considered as a final resolution to the problem of the relation of the changing to the fixed. Here, the author concludes that the fixity of Sadrian change should be criticized because it leads to accepting a view attributed to Rajol Hamedani about the “universal”. Manuscript profile
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        4 - A Critical Study of Western Rationalists’ Theories of Natural Law in the Modern Period (Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant)
        Mohammad Hossein  Talebi
        Among the various interpretations of natural law, the most favorite of them states that it refers to the orders of practical intellect regarding Man’s voluntary behaviors in all places and at all times that lead to permanent happiness if obeyed by human beings. The theo More
        Among the various interpretations of natural law, the most favorite of them states that it refers to the orders of practical intellect regarding Man’s voluntary behaviors in all places and at all times that lead to permanent happiness if obeyed by human beings. The theory of natural law in the modern period has received two opposing empirical and rationalist interpretations. By reason, modern rationalism means calculating reason, which is viewed as a tool for attaining material and immaterial (moral) wishes. Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant were three rationalist philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment who discussed and theorized about natural law. In this paper, after a brief account of their theories on natural law, the author evaluates them one by one. In the first section, the author argues that Montesquieu, by posing a self-made myth, states that following natural desire leads Man to happiness. This act of following in his view implies natural law. The most important criticism of Montesquieu’s theory is that he has confused the natural law with the law of nature. In the second section, the author argues that, unlike Montesquieu, Rousseau believes that natural law is not based on the reason but, rather, on human instincts and feelings. The basic problem of this theory is his material approach to human nature, which lowers Man to the level of animals. Finally, the third section presents a critical investigation of Kant’s natural law. In his view, natural law is different from the law of nature. Kant believes that natural law enjoys two characteristics: universality and intrinsicness. However, he has not referred to any of the applications of natural law and has failed in providing a complete explanation of this theory. This failure is rooted in the epistemological system of Kant’s philosophy, based on which the practical wisdom and its orders (or the same natural law) must be deemed unfounded and unreliable. Kant maintains that the issues related to immaterial and even material substances are polemic rather than demonstrative in nature. Similar to other critical studies, the present study was conducted following a mixed narrative-intellectual method. Accordingly, the views of the three rationalist philosophers of the modern period are initially explained and then examined and evaluated based on rational arguments and reasoning. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Character and Scientific Status of Mīrzā Ḥassan Kermānshāhī in Contemporary History of Philosophy and Wisdom in Iran
        Abbasali  Mansori
        Mīrzā Ḥassan Kermānshāhī (d. 1336 AH) was one of the prominent philosophers of the philosophical School of Tehran, who, despite his significant role in the history of contemporary Iranian philosophy, has remained unknown in academic communities and centers. This study a More
        Mīrzā Ḥassan Kermānshāhī (d. 1336 AH) was one of the prominent philosophers of the philosophical School of Tehran, who, despite his significant role in the history of contemporary Iranian philosophy, has remained unknown in academic communities and centers. This study aims to introduce this knowledgeable philosopher to the lovers of contemporary history of philosophy in Iran and Islamic philosophy and scientific philosophical communities relying on accurate and authentic sources. To accomplish this task, the author has tried to avoid marginal issues; however, this paper can be considered to be the most extensive study of Mīrzā Ḥassan Kermānshāhī’s character. He has also tried to introduce this philosopher’s masters and discuss the relationship between them, elaborate on Kermānshāhī’s self-study of philosophy, refer to some of his students who have rarely been named in related sources, and present an extensive analytic discussion of Kermānshāhī’s academic station regarding his vast knowledge, depth of thought and power of analysis, philosophical insight, gnostic thoughts, and teaching skills. Manuscript profile
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        6 - Historical Trends of Epistemological Issues in Pre-Sadrian Philosophical Tradition
        Ali Asghar  Jafari Valani Donya  Asadi Fakhrnejad
        A study of epistemological developments in Islamic philosophy indicates that, although the issues in this philosophical trend have not been independently dealt with and have been generally discussed under epistemological issues, there are other problems in Islamic philo More
        A study of epistemological developments in Islamic philosophy indicates that, although the issues in this philosophical trend have not been independently dealt with and have been generally discussed under epistemological issues, there are other problems in Islamic philosophy that, if organized and classified, can open the door to philosophical approaches to ontological discussions. Perhaps, some of the fundamental ambiguities in epistemology can be clarified based on the outcomes of such discussions. For example, reference can be made to the effects of ontological views of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī over their epistemology. The main question of this study is how an epistemological approach can be extracted from an investigation and analysis of a collection of problems and demonstrate it with reference to the standpoints and views of Islamic philosophers. In order to achieve this purpose, it must be said that an epistemology based on the sense, reason, and intuition can lead to the development of Islamic philosophers’ epistemology. The Peripatetic philosophy is mainly based on the intellect and reasoning, and the Illuminationist philosophy, although relying on reasoning, basically draws on unveiling and intuition in epistemological analyses. However, logic, as a gateway to epistemology, usually opens the discussion because almost all Islamic philosophers consider the theory of definition as a tool for unveiling the unknown (unveiling the general nature of affairs) relying on acquired knowledge and the five predicables (universals). Nevertheless, Suhrawardī and his followers, while relying on presential knowledge, believe that a genus-differentia definition is not justified and, by criticizing the theory of definition, try to discover the particular unknown through observation and illumination. Accordingly, the problem of vision and imagination in the common epistemological system is usually viewed as one of the sides of acquired knowledge. In contrast, it is explained under presential knowledge in Illuminationist philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        7 - Oliver Leaman’s View of the Conflict Between Revelation and Philosophy
        Alireza Asaadi
        The problem of the relationship between revelation and philosophy or the conflict between reason and faith is one of the most famous and challenging discussions in the history of Islamic philosophy. In fact, it has occupied the minds of prominent Islamic thinkers, both More
        The problem of the relationship between revelation and philosophy or the conflict between reason and faith is one of the most famous and challenging discussions in the history of Islamic philosophy. In fact, it has occupied the minds of prominent Islamic thinkers, both Shi‘ite and Sunnite, since the advent of Islam and, following this, has been discussed by Orientalists in the field of Islamic studies as well. Oliver Leaman, the Orientalist, Qur’ān researcher, and Western interpreter of Islamic philosophy, has dealt with the problem of the relationship between the Qur’ān and philosophy. While adopting a more moderate standpoint in comparison to many other Orientalists, and while acknowledging the consistency of revelation with philosophy, he believes that Qur’anic theorems and teachings have influenced the development of Islamic philosophy. Moreover, he has propounded a number of noteworthy points in his analysis of the theory of conflict of reason with revelation and evaluation of Islamic philosophers in this regard. Following a descriptive-critical method, this paper clarifies and criticizes Leaman’s view of this theory and demonstrates that, firstly, the conflict exists only between the human intellectual philosophical and Qur’anic perception of this problem, and the hypothesis of the conflict between revelation and philosophy among many Orient ologists stems from comparing Islam and the Holy Qur’ān with Christianity and the Holy Book. Secondly, the author states that, in contrast to Leaman’s claim, the solution provided by Islamic philosophers, including Ibn Rushd, does not necessitate undermining the significance of the Qur’ān and revelation and accusing Muslim philosophers of denying God’s knowledge of particulars and corporeal resurrection and following Aristotle regarding his theory of the soul, which originates in a misunderstanding of Islamic philosophers’ views of this conflict by opponents of philosophy in the Islamic world or Orientalists. Manuscript profile
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        8 - Fear of Death in Epicurean Philosophy
        Ahmad Asgari Seyednima Salehi
        This study investigates the basic principles and arguments of Epicurean philosophy in relation to the baselessness of fear of death and whether his reasoning in this regard is justified. In Epicurus’ philosophy, the soul is mortal and, thus, death means annihilation. He More
        This study investigates the basic principles and arguments of Epicurean philosophy in relation to the baselessness of fear of death and whether his reasoning in this regard is justified. In Epicurus’ philosophy, the soul is mortal and, thus, death means annihilation. He believes that although this idea does not negate happiness, fear of death impedes happiness. Hence, he provides some arguments to prove that it is unjustified and explains the correct way of encountering death. Here, while presenting a new interpretation of Epicurean view of fear of death, the author tries to propound and evaluate his views and arguments in the cultural and philosophical context of this problem and emphasizes that one must make a distinction between “fear of the process of dying” and “fear of being dead” in order to clearly understand the Epicurean view in this regard. Manuscript profile