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        1 - A Different Version of Immortality in Plato’s Symposium
        Hamidreza  Mahboobi Arani
        A well-established and common view in Plato’s philosophy is that the immortality of the soul after death is a persistent and fixed type of immortality. The human soul, or at least an important part of it, which is the same intellect, is a substance of a different type a Full Text
        A well-established and common view in Plato’s philosophy is that the immortality of the soul after death is a persistent and fixed type of immortality. The human soul, or at least an important part of it, which is the same intellect, is a substance of a different type and from a different world, which remains alive after death. However, Plato’s Symposium portrays a perspective of immortality that, through creating a phenomenological image of the soul and attributing the tendency for immortality to Eros, considers the soul to be vulnerable to change. Hence, he maintains that the immortality of the soul is different from the common sense interpretation of this concept. The present paper argues that, in order to understand and interpret Plato’s intended meaning of immortality in Symposium, it is necessary to pay careful attention to some of his remarks in this regard, as well as to his discussions of birth and education, and remembrance and reminiscence. In this way, one could infer a dynamic and creative model of immortality which neither necessitates the after-death subsistence of the identical soul, which enjoys the passive and stagnant introversion of the Ideas, nor presupposes the existence of a soul of another type. The present paper, while referring to and describing Plato’s four-fold model of immortality, explains their important, similar, and, in some cases, different characteristics. It also demonstrates that this immortality is in permanent unity with the creation of certain words regarding true virtue or its images and life in the memory of future generations and indirectly affects the world affairs. Manuscript Document
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        2 - Place and Time of Mullā Muḥammad Kaẓīm Hezārjarībī in the History of Rational Sciences with an Emphasis on the Content of Theological Manuscripts
        Ali Ghanbarian Abbas Bakhshande Bali
        One of the Shi‘ite thinkers whose scientific contributions have rarely been explored is Mullā Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezārjarībī Astarābādī (died in 1234 AH). He was one of the Shi‘ite scholars of the late Zand and early Qajar periods who conducted several scientific studies in Full Text
        One of the Shi‘ite thinkers whose scientific contributions have rarely been explored is Mullā Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezārjarībī Astarābādī (died in 1234 AH). He was one of the Shi‘ite scholars of the late Zand and early Qajar periods who conducted several scientific studies in different fields of theology, particularly on Islamic beliefs. Hezārjarībī’s works have never been published; however, a great number of his manuscripts in Persian and Arabic are available today. His writings and translations have played a significant role in the dissemination and expansion of the Shi‘ite culture and philosophy. When composing, he always paid attention to the point that his writings should be readable by all the people interested in the field of theology, and that is why most of his works are written in Persian. Following a descriptive-analytic method and relying on library resources, particularly, a number of critically corrected manuscripts, the authors of this paper aim to investigate the nature and content of Hezārjarībī’s most important discussions regarding theology. The findings of this study demonstrate that, in his view, theology is intrinsic while Islam is not. In order to prove the existence of God, he resorted to a variety of proofs such as possibility and necessity, order, and fiṭrah (human nature) arguments. Moreover, he tried to provide the correct meanings of some divine attributes such as will, justice, and wisdom to remove some theological ambiguities. Manuscript Document
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        3 - Concept of “Perennial Essence” and the Problem of “Revival or Establishment” in Suhrawardī’s Philosophy
        Ali Babaei
        The concept of “perennial essence” and its relationship with “Khosravani wisdom” in Illuminationist philosophy has prompted some researchers, such as Henry Corbin, to consider the purpose of Illuminationist philosophy and Suhrawardī’s “huge lifelong project” to be the r Full Text
        The concept of “perennial essence” and its relationship with “Khosravani wisdom” in Illuminationist philosophy has prompted some researchers, such as Henry Corbin, to consider the purpose of Illuminationist philosophy and Suhrawardī’s “huge lifelong project” to be the revival of the philosophy of ancient Persia known as Khosravani wisdom. The present study reveals that several pieces of evidence in Illuminationist philosophy indicate that his goal was to establish a new school of philosophy rather than merely reviving a traditional one. An analysis of the concept of “perennial” and the related concepts and the attention to the newly emerged referents of perennial essence in various civilizations disclose the truth of Suhrawardī’s view. There are several differences between the concepts of “establishment” and “revival”; revival is a secondary, dependent, and imitative job, while establishment is an original, fundamental, and innovative endeavor which can also be followed by revival. Moreover, revival is consistent with historical changes, while pre-eternity is not a historical entity and is, rather, metahistorical, and any reception from perennial essence means receiving from a metahistorical source. Hence, discovering the relationship between ancient Persia and Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy could never be Suhrawardī’s main purpose. If he considers Khosravani wisdom to be a manifestation of the perennial essence, his view of Pythagorean philosophy and other schools of philosophy in some civilizations such as those of India and Babylonia should be the same. As a result, the advocates of the idea of the revival of Persian wisdom should repeat exactly the same views regarding the revival of Greek philosophy and other philosophical schools, while this is not the case. Therefore, Suhrawardī’s main purpose, unlike what some researchers claim, was to establish the Illuminationist philosophy and not to revive Khosravani wisdom. A careful scrutiny of the content of the theory of perennial essence and its concomitants nullifies any claim as to Suhrawardī’s being a Shu‘ūbi philosopher or the dominance of neo-Shu‘ūbism over his philosophical thoughts. Manuscript Document
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        4 - An Approach to the Concept of Knowledge in Pahlavi Texts and its Connection with Morality and Education
        Sheyda  Riyazi Heravi Masud  Safaei Moghaddm Mohammad Jafar  Pakseresht Shahram  Jalilian
        Knowledge has been manifested in Pahlavi texts, such as Avesta, in the word “wisdom”. In such texts, Ahura Mazda is the origin of wisdom and knowledge and controls the beginning and end of creation in the light of His Omniscient wisdom. In Pahlavi texts, Bahman or good Full Text
        Knowledge has been manifested in Pahlavi texts, such as Avesta, in the word “wisdom”. In such texts, Ahura Mazda is the origin of wisdom and knowledge and controls the beginning and end of creation in the light of His Omniscient wisdom. In Pahlavi texts, Bahman or good thought is the first Amoša Spenta that Ahura Mazda created and, in this way, actualized His role in creation. Moreover, Bahman is the symbol and manifestation or Ahura Mazda’s Omniscient wisdom of His created things through which Man attains the knowledge of religion and Ahura Mazda Himself. Additionally, moral life, as the ultimate goal in Zoroastrianism is realized in Pahlavi texts in the word pledge or moderation. This moral virtue is based on knowledge. In Pahlavi texts, training is also the foundation of developing asn kherad (intrinsic wisdom), wisdom, and adopting moral virtues; therefore, it is considered to be one of the different types of perennial wisdom). Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study investigates the concept of knowledge and its different types in Pahlavi texts and analyzes the quality of its unity with morality and education. Manuscript Document
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        5 - Socio-political Roots and Consequences of Gandhi’s View of God and God’s Relationship with Truth
        Ali Naqi  Baqershahi
        The present paper investigates the socio-political roots and consequences of Gandhi’s view of God and God’s relationship with truth. His idea of God and truth is rooted in Vedanta School of philosophy, Vaishnavism, and his studies of Islam and Christianity. Based on Ved Full Text
        The present paper investigates the socio-political roots and consequences of Gandhi’s view of God and God’s relationship with truth. His idea of God and truth is rooted in Vedanta School of philosophy, Vaishnavism, and his studies of Islam and Christianity. Based on Vedanta philosophy, truth is discussed at two levels of nirguna (a truth without attributes or station of essence) and saguna (a truth with attributes or the station of names and attributes). In Vaishnavism, reference is made to Vishnu, who is one of the Vedic deities, as a personal God and the preserver of the world. Because of his philosophical interest in Vedanta and his family belief in Vaishnavism, Gandhi believed in both impersonal (Vedantic) God and personal (Vishnu) God. At the beginning of developing his philosophical thoughts, for several reasons, he concluded that God is the same as the truth for he believed that one can only refer to God as the truth. In his view, truth is not an attribute of God and is, rather, the same as God. In Indian philosophical texts, the term satya is used to refer to the truth. The root of this word is /sat/ (is) meaning that God is the same as the truth and being. Later Gandhi decided that, instead of saying, “God is the truth”, he should say, “the truth is God”. In his view there is a subtle difference between these two statements. Gandhi states that the only way through which one can attain the truth is ahimsā (non-violence) and, in order to clarify this term, he refers to the concept of satyagrah (holding to the truth), which, he believes, is the technique of using ahimsā. This mainly focuses on the great influence of Gandhi’s approach to God and the truth over the quality of his socio-political campaigns against British colonists. Manuscript Document
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        6 - Principle of the One in the View of ‘Alī Qulī Ibn Qarachāqāy Khān
        Mansour Nasiri Yousef Daneshvar Nilu Mahdi Askari
        The al-Wahid principle has been constantly drawing attention from Muslim philosophers and theologians throughout the history of Islamic thought, while some have sought to substantiate this principle and some others have attempted to criticize and reject it. It was not o Full Text
        The al-Wahid principle has been constantly drawing attention from Muslim philosophers and theologians throughout the history of Islamic thought, while some have sought to substantiate this principle and some others have attempted to criticize and reject it. It was not only theologians who challenged the principle, it also did not sit well with some philosophers who were critical of it. One of these philosophers was Aliquli Bin Qarachghai Khan Torkamani, a Safavid era philosopher and pupil to Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi. He challenges Ibn Sina’s arguments for the al-Wahid, believing that if we consider the Necessary Existent as a pure simple entity that is aware of oneself and others and is also able to create others, then, knowing that knowledge and power are identical with His essence, we can say that the emanation of the multiple from the Necessary Existent will not require existence of multiple aspects within Him. Accordingly, we can accept the emanation of the multiple from the one. In this article we undertake an explication and critique of Aliquli Bin Qarachghai Khan’s view of the al-Wahid principle. In brief, this article argues that although to some degree his critiques of Ibn Sina’s proofs are successful, he fails to take an all-inclusive approach to the issue. Manuscript Document
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        7 - The Discussion between Abū Bishr Mattā and Abū Sa‘īd Sirāfī on Grammar in the Cradle of History
        Atefeh  Ranjbar Darestani Morteza Mezginejad Mohammad Fazlhashemi
        An important part of disagreements with Greek sciences in the world of Islam pertains to their opposition to the field of logic. The discussion of Abū Bishr Mattā (died in 328 AH) with Abū Sa‘īd Sirāfī (died in 368 AH) over logic and grammar is among the first manifesta Full Text
        An important part of disagreements with Greek sciences in the world of Islam pertains to their opposition to the field of logic. The discussion of Abū Bishr Mattā (died in 328 AH) with Abū Sa‘īd Sirāfī (died in 368 AH) over logic and grammar is among the first manifestations of such disagreements. The studies focusing on this discussion mainly emphasize Sirāfī’s attempts at proving the superiority of syntax over logic, which, by itself, has resulted in the dominance of a linguistic approach over this debate. As a result, the whole discussion has been reduced to a number of linguistic debates in the mentioned studies. Nevertheless, this debate enjoys some hidden and profound methodological and epistemological aspects which could play a significant role in the correct recognition of the historical context in which it has taken place. In the present paper, the authors not only refer to these almost forgotten methodological and epistemological aspects but also demonstrate their central role through identifying them in the structure and texture of the words of the two scholars. Finally, they connect such aspects to a much vaster historical context. Manuscript Document
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        8 - Editor's Notes
        Hossein  Kalbasi Ashtari
        Kovid 19