The study of moral propositions and their nature has attracted the attention of philosophers since long ago. Whether these propositions enjoy sufficient flexibility in terms of content is one of the problems discussed in the field of philosophy of ethics. In the West, t
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The study of moral propositions and their nature has attracted the attention of philosophers since long ago. Whether these propositions enjoy sufficient flexibility in terms of content is one of the problems discussed in the field of philosophy of ethics. In the West, the modern philosopher, Kant, believed that moral propositions should enjoy a categorical nature. In his view, determining moral acts by any factor other than the “moral law” will result in subordinating them to the subjective will. His insistence on the validity of the categorical imperative originates in purifying practical wisdom from all empirical factors such as hedonism, sentimentalism, God’s Will, and intellectual perfection. Moreover, he sought the “end” and “good” in man’s nature. Accordingly, the law of ethics and the objective principle of act are introduced as the bases of the categorical imperative and, as a result, all other factors are invalidated.
In other fields of philosophy, particularly, in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the emphasis on the categorical nature of moral judgments is seriously criticized. Mulla Sadra rejects not only Kant’s a priori interpretation of practical reason but also his interpretation of the good and the end. Alongside moral facts, Mulla Sadra speaks of individual and social differences and, as a result, accepts several levels of being in lower realms of human beings. All these plural beings affect the validity of particular and unnecessary judgments and challenge Kant’s categorical ideas.
The present paper analyzes Kant’s view of the categorical imperative and, then, criticizes it relying on the philosophical ideas of Mulla Sadra and some of the commentators of Kant.
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