Substance

Open Access Article

1 - Substance in Modern Empiricism
Alireza Javanmardi Adib Mohammad Akvan

The epistemological approach to Empiricism in the Modern era is opposed to the rationalist approach of Descartes and his followers, who believed in the existence of certain innate ideas prior to experience in Man’s mind. The thinkers advocating this approach explored ra More

The epistemological approach to Empiricism in the Modern era is opposed to the rationalist approach of Descartes and his followers, who believed in the existence of certain innate ideas prior to experience in Man’s mind. The thinkers advocating this approach explored rationalists’ metaphysical problems through denying innate ideas and considering sense experience as the source of knowledge. The results of such investigations had nothing to say, even at their peak, about substance except when trying to deny it. Accordingly, given the process of the development of empiricism by the pioneers of this approach and its consequences, the authors of this paper have tried to deal with the following basic question: After accepting the specific reading of some empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume from the process of attaining knowledge, would it be possible to accept the existence of substance? Here, the writers respond that, based on their studies of the above thinkers’ views of substance, the acceptance of substance is not consistent with empiricism. This is because substance is a meta-empirical entity which sense experience cannot grasp. What follows sense experience in the end is nothing but a collection of impressions which can never explain the existence of substance. Manuscript profile

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2 - Substantiality of the Soul in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra
Maliheh Saberi Najafabadi

One of the important problems of Islamic philosophy is the demonstration of the substantiality of the soul. In spite of their agreement concerning the substantiality of the soul, Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina have some basic disagreements in the interpretation and explanatio More

One of the important problems of Islamic philosophy is the demonstration of the substantiality of the soul. In spite of their agreement concerning the substantiality of the soul, Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina have some basic disagreements in the interpretation and explanation of this principle. The extent of these disagreements has also stretched to some critical issues such the explanation of the soul, its changes, and its relationship with other faculties, which are the focus of this paper. According to Ibn Sina, possible beings consist of two analytic-rational components, that is, existence and quiddity. He also maintains that the source of the division of categories, under which substance and accident fall, is quiddity itself. The difference between substance and accident also lies in the fact that existence is substance by itself, and existence is accident through the other. Therefore, the soul is an immaterial substance that performs voluntary administrative acts and perceives universal affairs. It has some branches or faculties through which it carries out its acts. In this approach, the differences among human souls, from their highest to lowest levels, are rooted in accidents, and no change occurs in their substance. In Mulla Sadra’s view, too, accident has no independence before substance, thus it is a dependent truth enjoying an existence depending on the other. Nevertheless, based on the principle of the principiality of existence, the criterion for individuation is existence; an existence which underlies the individuation of a subject and is the referent for substance itself and a referent for all accidents. In other words, it is a single existence that is a referent for man with various accidents. The soul is a substance commensurate with existence and enjoys an essential and graded existence the accidents of which are considered to be the grades of this truth. The soul’s faculties are its modes and grades, and the perfections attained by the soul originate in its unity with perceptive forms. Manuscript profile

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3 - Khalil Khan Thaqafi (A‘alam al-Dawlah): A Philosophical Translation concerning Time and Place
Reza Ranjbar

After graduation from Dar al-Funun and before going abroad, Dr. Khalil Khan Thaqafi translated and wrote two treatises on time and place. In the first treatise, which was introduced in the previous issue of History of Philosophy Journal, he discusses the idea of finite More

After graduation from Dar al-Funun and before going abroad, Dr. Khalil Khan Thaqafi translated and wrote two treatises on time and place. In the first treatise, which was introduced in the previous issue of History of Philosophy Journal, he discusses the idea of finite and infinite time and place. The second treatise, which is introduced in this issue, includes the translation of a short part of a huge philosophical book by Victor Cousin, the French philosopher of the 19th century, discussing whether time and place are substance or not. Manuscript profile

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4 - Time and Place in the View of Mirza Khalil Khan Thaqafi (A‘lam al-awlah): Two Hand-Written Treatises
Reza Ranjbar

Doctor Khalil Khan Thaqafi (A‘lam al-Dawlah), a physician, writer, and translator of the Qajar period and one of the first graduates of modern medicine in Iran, translated and wrote two treatises about time and place after he graduated from Dar al-Funun and before he we More

Doctor Khalil Khan Thaqafi (A‘lam al-Dawlah), a physician, writer, and translator of the Qajar period and one of the first graduates of modern medicine in Iran, translated and wrote two treatises about time and place after he graduated from Dar al-Funun and before he went abroad. In the treatise that he wrote himself, Mirza Khalil Khan discusses the quality of the development of the idea of space, the distinction between the idea of environmental space and infinite space, the quality of the formation of the idea of infinite space, the idea of space as substance, the infinity of space with respect to its breadth and continuity, the development of the idea of time, and the idea of time as a predicate of space. In this treatise, he briefly explains and criticizes the ideas of such philosophers as Victor Cousin, Stewart Mill, and Spinoza. In the second treatise, which is a translation, he discusses whether time and place are substance or not. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

5 - On the Translation of Aristotle’s Ousia as Substance
Hamid Khosravani Hamidreza Mahboobi Arani Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati

Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of bein More

Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of being, and sometimes as essence and quiddity. Hence, the difficulty and disagreement among the translators and interpreters on the best equivalent for Ousia in other languages. In the present paper, after a short historical discussion about Ousia, I examine some common equivalents for the Ousia in Latin and English and attempt to discuss the different reasons for and against each equivalent. My argument, in general, goes for the term Substance, and I will bring 8 reasons to establish the argument. Manuscript profile

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6 - A Study of Multiplicity of the Category of Substance in Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī
Mahdi Dasht Bozorgi Mohammad Ismail Abdollahi Mohammad Karaminia

Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has sometimes provided two different views regarding a scientific problem, one following the method of the people of kalam and the other following the method of philosophers. At first sight, one might assume that Ṭūsī is making contradictory co More

Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has sometimes provided two different views regarding a scientific problem, one following the method of the people of kalam and the other following the method of philosophers. At first sight, one might assume that Ṭūsī is making contradictory comments; however, an analysis of his discussions reveal that such contradictions are only superficial and can be explained justifiably within the framework of his general system of philosophy. One of such contradictory cases pertains to the category of substance. In his works on logic, similar to Peripatetic philosophers, Ṭūsī considers substance to be a category or genus of genera; however, he deemed of substance as a secondary intelligible in his Tajrīd al-i‘tiqād. The present paper aims to clarify this view of the multiplicity of the category of substance. Then, in order to judge its legitimacy, the authors pose some possibilities and finally introduce one of the views which seems to be compatible with reality as their own standpoint. Through referring to Ṭūsī’s words and considering his social and academic position during his time, when philosophers were under huge attacks by mutikallimun, as well as given his moderate, truth-loving, and academic character, the authors demonstrate that this contradiction is superficial rather than real. Following the library method, this research was conducted based on a thorough study of Ṭūsī’s works. Nevertheless, the researchers also took the views of his commentators into consideration when necessary. Manuscript profile

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7 - Aristotelean Roots of the Soul’s Corporeal Origination in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
Hamideh Ansari Hassan Fathi Morteza Shajari

20.1001.1.20089589.1402.14.1.7.7

Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of More

Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence. Manuscript profile

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8 - Labyrinth of the World: Deconstruction of Nicolaus Cusanus’ Perception of Substance Based on the Views of Meister Eckhart and Ibn Sīnā
Ebrahim Ranjbar Mohammadreza Asadi

20.1001.1.20089589.1402.14.2.6.8

Nicolaus Cusanus, the German Philosopher and theologian, tried to revise the metaphysical views of his time in his works. He tried to present his philosophical approach systematically by posing a number of innovative theories about creation, Man’s relationship with the More

Nicolaus Cusanus, the German Philosopher and theologian, tried to revise the metaphysical views of his time in his works. He tried to present his philosophical approach systematically by posing a number of innovative theories about creation, Man’s relationship with the infinite affair, motion, and knowledge, as well as by revising the common religious views regarding such theorems as the first sin and creation out of nothing. Here, the authors have initially tried to examine Cusanus’ important views about the relationship between Man and the infinite affair, and through which reveal that, from this point of view, there is only one substance in the world, and anything other than that is among its necessary accidents. Next, they propound the concepts of unfolding and folding and introduce a category called the trans-substantial motion in Cusanus’ specific reading. After discussing his views, the background of the formation of his approach are deconstructed. In doing so, Meister Eckhart’s interpretation of some sections of the Holy Book and some of Ibn Sīnā’s fundamental metaphysical views are presented. Then the authors argue that Ibn Sīnā’s innovative approaches and Meister Eckhart’s novel interpretations pave the context for postulating a new metaphysics that is different from the traditional one. This can introduce new perspectives for philosophical studies and shed a new light on the history of philosophical thought. Manuscript profile

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