Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has sometimes provided two different views regarding a scientific problem, one following the method of the people of kalam and the other following the method of philosophers. At first sight, one might assume that Ṭūsī is making contradictory co
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Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has sometimes provided two different views regarding a scientific problem, one following the method of the people of kalam and the other following the method of philosophers. At first sight, one might assume that Ṭūsī is making contradictory comments; however, an analysis of his discussions reveal that such contradictions are only superficial and can be explained justifiably within the framework of his general system of philosophy. One of such contradictory cases pertains to the category of substance. In his works on logic, similar to Peripatetic philosophers, Ṭūsī considers substance to be a category or genus of genera; however, he deemed of substance as a secondary intelligible in his Tajrīd al-i‘tiqād. The present paper aims to clarify this view of the multiplicity of the category of substance. Then, in order to judge its legitimacy, the authors pose some possibilities and finally introduce one of the views which seems to be compatible with reality as their own standpoint. Through referring to Ṭūsī’s words and considering his social and academic position during his time, when philosophers were under huge attacks by mutikallimun, as well as given his moderate, truth-loving, and academic character, the authors demonstrate that this contradiction is superficial rather than real. Following the library method, this research was conducted based on a thorough study of Ṭūsī’s works. Nevertheless, the researchers also took the views of his commentators into consideration when necessary.
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