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    • List of Articles Hamidreza Mahboobi Arani

      • Open Access Article

        1 - Happiness and Contemplation of Beauty in Plato’s Symposium
        Hamidreza  Mahboobi Arani
        Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is one of the most important parts of his works. The present paper exclusively examines the last of Diotima’s speech, where Plato uses some words and phrases focusing on the relationship between happiness and contemplation of beauty Full Text
        Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is one of the most important parts of his works. The present paper exclusively examines the last of Diotima’s speech, where Plato uses some words and phrases focusing on the relationship between happiness and contemplation of beauty. Diotima claims that, only when a philosopher or lover (here, in love with Sophia) reaches the peak of his love and begins his contemplation of beauty, he could attain knowledge, happiness, and true eternity, but the question is, “How could this claim be interpreted?” The purpose of the author in this paper is to attract the attention of readers to the interpretive point that Plato’s understanding of the meaning of contemplation of beauty should be perceived in the context of an ethical and political program and in relation to the practical life of a citizen rather than within a purely abstract and theoretical inferential framework. The first part of this paper explains the intended problem through an investigation of different sections of Diotima’s speech. In the second part, with particular attention to Alcibiades’ speech, the author demonstrates that, in order to learn about Plato’s understanding of this problem, one must pay particular attention to the various dimensions of this speech. Finally, he concludes the paper by presenting an interpretation of Diotima’s last words based on a general reading of Symposium and, specifically, Alcibiades’ character and words. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        2 - A Different Version of Immortality in Plato’s Symposium
        Hamidreza  Mahboobi Arani
        A well-established and common view in Plato’s philosophy is that the immortality of the soul after death is a persistent and fixed type of immortality. The human soul, or at least an important part of it, which is the same intellect, is a substance of a different type a Full Text
        A well-established and common view in Plato’s philosophy is that the immortality of the soul after death is a persistent and fixed type of immortality. The human soul, or at least an important part of it, which is the same intellect, is a substance of a different type and from a different world, which remains alive after death. However, Plato’s Symposium portrays a perspective of immortality that, through creating a phenomenological image of the soul and attributing the tendency for immortality to Eros, considers the soul to be vulnerable to change. Hence, he maintains that the immortality of the soul is different from the common sense interpretation of this concept. The present paper argues that, in order to understand and interpret Plato’s intended meaning of immortality in Symposium, it is necessary to pay careful attention to some of his remarks in this regard, as well as to his discussions of birth and education, and remembrance and reminiscence. In this way, one could infer a dynamic and creative model of immortality which neither necessitates the after-death subsistence of the identical soul, which enjoys the passive and stagnant introversion of the Ideas, nor presupposes the existence of a soul of another type. The present paper, while referring to and describing Plato’s four-fold model of immortality, explains their important, similar, and, in some cases, different characteristics. It also demonstrates that this immortality is in permanent unity with the creation of certain words regarding true virtue or its images and life in the memory of future generations and indirectly affects the world affairs. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        3 - On the Translation of Aristotle’s Ousia as Substance
        Hamid Khosravani Hamidreza  Mahboobi Arani Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
        Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of bein Full Text
        Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of being, and sometimes as essence and quiddity. Hence, the difficulty and disagreement among the translators and interpreters on the best equivalent for Ousia in other languages. In the present paper, after a short historical discussion about Ousia, I examine some common equivalents for the Ousia in Latin and English and attempt to discuss the different reasons for and against each equivalent. My argument, in general, goes for the term Substance, and I will bring 8 reasons to establish the argument. Manuscript Document