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        1 - Place and Time of Mullā Muḥammad Kaẓīm Hezārjarībī in the History of Rational Sciences with an Emphasis on the Content of Theological Manuscripts
        Ali Ghanbarian Abbas Bakhshande Bali
        One of the Shi‘ite thinkers whose scientific contributions have rarely been explored is Mullā Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezārjarībī Astarābādī (died in 1234 AH). He was one of the Shi‘ite scholars of the late Zand and early Qajar periods who conducted several scientific studies in More
        One of the Shi‘ite thinkers whose scientific contributions have rarely been explored is Mullā Muḥammad Kaẓim Hezārjarībī Astarābādī (died in 1234 AH). He was one of the Shi‘ite scholars of the late Zand and early Qajar periods who conducted several scientific studies in different fields of theology, particularly on Islamic beliefs. Hezārjarībī’s works have never been published; however, a great number of his manuscripts in Persian and Arabic are available today. His writings and translations have played a significant role in the dissemination and expansion of the Shi‘ite culture and philosophy. When composing, he always paid attention to the point that his writings should be readable by all the people interested in the field of theology, and that is why most of his works are written in Persian. Following a descriptive-analytic method and relying on library resources, particularly, a number of critically corrected manuscripts, the authors of this paper aim to investigate the nature and content of Hezārjarībī’s most important discussions regarding theology. The findings of this study demonstrate that, in his view, theology is intrinsic while Islam is not. In order to prove the existence of God, he resorted to a variety of proofs such as possibility and necessity, order, and fiṭrah (human nature) arguments. Moreover, he tried to provide the correct meanings of some divine attributes such as will, justice, and wisdom to remove some theological ambiguities. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Historical Time and Philosophical Time in Ibrahimi Dinani’s View
        M‘asumeh  Qorbani Anderehci
        Perception of time is of an intellectual nature, and the human mind can easily divide it into seconds and minutes, for example, and measure it. However, when speaking of the truth of time, one is in fact faced with a complex and difficult mystery. The attempts at disamb More
        Perception of time is of an intellectual nature, and the human mind can easily divide it into seconds and minutes, for example, and measure it. However, when speaking of the truth of time, one is in fact faced with a complex and difficult mystery. The attempts at disambiguating this mystery has resulted in wide-spread disagreements among philosophers and thinkers so that some of them hold that time exists while some others deny its existence. Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani, a contemporary Iranian thinker, conceives of time as an ontological entity. He has reanalyzed and reinterpreted the views of several thinkers regarding time and believes that everything in the world of being is manifested and emerges through the channel of human consciousness. He emphasizes that the relationship between Man and time is so strong that its rupture is meaningless. Dinani maintains that time has two dimensions: one is the material dimension, which is realized in the material world, and the other is the Ideal dimension, which is indeed perceived as a path towards the world of meaning. The latter, while being material, is of an Ideal nature. In his view, time in its material dimension is the same as the measure of motion, and time in the world of thought is identical with the form of human perception. Manuscript profile
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        3 - A Study of the Methodological Development of Interpretive Philosophy in Islam from Kindī to Mīr Dāmād
        Seyed Mohammad Hosain  Mirdamadi
        This study examines the background of pre-Sadrian Islamic philosophers’ method of interpretive or t’awīlī thinking following a descriptive-analytic method. Interpretive philosophy has been defined in different ways; however, its general feature is going beyond the surfa More
        This study examines the background of pre-Sadrian Islamic philosophers’ method of interpretive or t’awīlī thinking following a descriptive-analytic method. Interpretive philosophy has been defined in different ways; however, its general feature is going beyond the surface meaning of concepts and employing both reason and revelation in interpreting a text. A glance at the historical development of this method demonstrates its general growth, although with some fluctuations, in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This is because the process of t’awīl is rooted in the move from the separation of religion and philosophy towards their graded unity. A method of thinking that leads to unity indicates intellectual growth in case it is based on sound reasoning because the intellect advocates unity while imagination is pluralist. From a historical perspective, it can be said that philosophers’ interpretive thoughts have gradually moved away from defending the opposition of religion and philosophy to accepting that their truths are inseparable. In the case of the former standpoint, philosophers sometimes followed the exoteric meanings of religion and sometimes took side with the intellect and philosophy. However, later they unanimously concluded that religion and philosophy share the same truth that has been expressed in different languages. Therefore, the important point is to perceive their methods and languages and explain the related constraints. Hence, we are witnessing a process of monopoly and partiality instead of universality and holism. Manuscript profile
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        4 - An Analytic Critique of the Reductionist Approach to Islamic Philosophy
        Zahra  Mazaheri Seyyed Mohammad Kazem  Alavi
        One of the recent debates regarding Islamic philosophy focuses on its originality and the questions of the “possibility of Islamic philosophy”. This identity-related problem has a significant effect on the history and future of Islamic philosophy. The view of the oppone More
        One of the recent debates regarding Islamic philosophy focuses on its originality and the questions of the “possibility of Islamic philosophy”. This identity-related problem has a significant effect on the history and future of Islamic philosophy. The view of the opponents of the originality of this denomination, including Orientalists, Western historiographers, some Arab scholars, and those who are against any kind of religious philosophy can be considered to be reductionist. In their theories, they have reduced Islamic philosophy to a philosophy imitating Greek philosophy, Islamic Kalām and theology, and Arabic philosophy. Opposing Orientalists and historiographers view Greek philosophy as the base and Islamic philosophy as one of its branches. Some of the opponents believe that any attempt at establishing Islamic philosophy is in vain by insisting on the incompatibility of religion and philosophy. Moreover, by rejecting the possibility of religious philosophy, including Islamic philosophy, they maintain that the use of the word Islamic as an adjective for philosophy, as an intellectual science, is not justified and, thus, equate Islamic philosophy with Kalām and theology. Some other opponents, including Arabs, avoid the use of the phrase “Islamic philosophy”, and, by emphasizing the language of philosophical texts in Islamic tradition, call it Arabic philosophy. They limit Arabic philosophy to the Arab race and believe that this view is supported by history of philosophy. The present paper provides a critical analysis of the proponents of reductionist approaches to Islamic philosophy and aims to demonstrate and defend the necessity of its originality as a historical reality. Manuscript profile
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        5 - The Question of the Consistency of Intellectual Arguments and Intuition: Evolution of Fundamental Principles
        Ghasem Pourhasan پورحسن
        Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two ration More
        Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā’s philosophies are based on reason, and the further we go from these two philosophers, intuition and unveiling replace philosophical reasoning. The most important feature of the School of Isfahan is considered to be the synthesis of these two rational and gnostic approaches. This school of philosophy claims to have integrated philosophical and demonstrative aspects of affairs with religious teachings and, specifically, the Imāmīyah Qur’anic-narrative thoughts. All thinkers of the School of Isfahan have comprehensively explained and extended the Imāmīyah ḥadīth or commented on them based the Qur’anic intellectual wisdom. The secretive and allegorical approach to interpretation became prevalent in Ibn Sīnā’s time; however, writing commentaries on ḥadīths and traditional thoughts are among the unique characteristics of the philosophical school of Isfahan. This method has been in use since then, and some of the prominent post-Sadrian philosophers view writing interpretations and comments on Qur’anic verses as an inseparable part of philosophical tradition. Perhaps, the only exception here who has emphasized the distinction between these two fields is ‘Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Nevertheless, the fundamental question here is whether the School of Isfahan, with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical system at its center, represents a philosophical and demonstrative school of thought or depends on religious thought and employs argumentation merely to access previously-established and correct thoughts. Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers have paid attention to this problem and emphasized the consistency of these two methods. The most important questions in this discussion include the following: 1) Is the method of rational argument completely different from the religious method? 2) If they are different, which depends on which? 3) Which is the basis in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy: rational reasoning or defending Sharī‘ah and revealed thoughts? How could rational affairs, which can be verified or rejected, and Shar‘ī teachings, which cannot be rejected, be compatible with each other? Here, the author tries to show that Mullā Ṣadrā’s effort to establish this consistency has not been much successful. In fact, in doing so, he has had to either forget about rational reasoning or interpret the religion rationally to prove their consistency. Manuscript profile