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        1 - A Critique of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s Criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s View of the Truth of Knowledge
        SeyedehZahra Mousavi Baygi Vahid Khademzadeh
        Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different More
        Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different occasions in many of his works. He has conceived of knowledge sometimes as pure quality, sometimes as quality possessing relation, and sometimes as pure relation. Moreover, he has interpreted knowledge as abstraction from matter in some of his works. Such a diversity of interpretations has given an excuse to some people such as Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī to criticize and question Ibn Sīnā’s view of the truth of knowledge. In different places in his works, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī emphasizes that Ibn Sīnā’s view of knowledge was divided, and he failed to attain a single standpoint concerning the truth of knowledge. The present study, which was conducted following an analytic-descriptive method and a critical approach, firstly presents Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim and, then, evaluates its truth. Next, the authors delve into his other works to examine the definitions of knowledge in his view. The findings of this study demonstrate that, although there are some fundamental problems in Ibn Sīnā’s view, his words are based on his own principles, are solid, and can be reduced to a unitary view. However, Rāzī’s words on this problem are inconsistent. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Theoretical Changes about the Faculty of Estimation in the Course of Historical Development of Islamic Philosophy
        Mohammad-Ali  Ardestani
        The faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meani More
        The faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meanings has placed it on top of all inner particular powers. Following a descriptive-analytic evaluation method, the present paper examines the development of the views of Muslim philosophers in this regard. Three important theories stand out in this process. In their quest to attribute a specific source to each kind of perception, Peripatetic philosophers consider the faculty of estimation to be independent from others, place it alongside the faculties of sensation, imagination, and intellect, and emphasize that it can perceive the nature of all specific universals. Accordingly, perceptions are divided in two four sensory, imaginative, estimative, and rational types. Among the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy, some philosophers such as Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī have advocated the Peripatetics on this ground, but Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī have criticized this theory each in their own way. Mullā Ṣadrā has promoted the faculty of estimation to the level of the intellect and placed it at the level of revealed intellect. Accordingly, perceptions are divided into three sensory, imaginative, and rational types. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has attributed the faculty of estimation to the common sense and demoted its status to the level of the senses. He acknowledges the unity of sensory, imaginative, and estimative perceptions. Manuscript profile
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        3 - A Comparative Study of the Problem of Evil in Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā (With a Focus on its Historical Aspect)
        Mahmud  Seidy
        The present paper deals with a comparative study of the views of Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā regarding evil. In spite of the existing differences concerning this problem in their philosophies, there are also some similarities, and Ibn Sīnā is influenced by Plotinus with respe More
        The present paper deals with a comparative study of the views of Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā regarding evil. In spite of the existing differences concerning this problem in their philosophies, there are also some similarities, and Ibn Sīnā is influenced by Plotinus with respect to his response to the problem of evil. Among the similarities between them in this area, one can refer to the self-evident nature of the existence of evil, exclusivity of the realization of evil to the world of matter and the impossibility of its realization in the immaterial world, and the non-existence nature of evil and good nature of all beings based on a general view of the world. However, unlike Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā does not consider matter as being essentially evil and non-existential. Rather, he maintains that matter is a correlative, analogical, and existential thing. Plotinus views the relationship between good and evil of the type of opposition, while Ibn Sīnā sees it as a non-existential and habitual one. Moreover, according to Plotinus, matter or the same essentially evil thing is created from the particular spirit. Nevertheless, Ibn Sīnā argues that the essential possibility of the Active intellect causes the emanation of matter, and its otherness necessity aspect results in the emanation of form, on which evil sometimes occurs to. Manuscript profile
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        4 - Fārābī and Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy in the First European Universities
        Reza  Mahoozi
        Fārābī, the renowned Iranian philosopher, is one of the central figures of Peripatetic philosophy in the world of Islam. The collection of his thoughts travelled beyond Islamic borders to Asian, Europe and Africa posthumously and influenced the scientific fields of Jewi More
        Fārābī, the renowned Iranian philosopher, is one of the central figures of Peripatetic philosophy in the world of Islam. The collection of his thoughts travelled beyond Islamic borders to Asian, Europe and Africa posthumously and influenced the scientific fields of Jewish, Christian, and other non-Islamic lands. The thoughts of Fārābī and two other prominent figures of this school of philosophy, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, exercised an undeniable impact on the development of the higher scientific centers of Europe of the 13-15 centuries (AD). In fact, without considering their role in the formation of the first European universities, especially the university of Paris and the process of establishing the faculty of philosophy during the conflict between the two faculties of theology and art, one cannot attain a true knowledge of the reasons behind the development and expansion of the first European universities. Relying on valid historical documents and reports, this paper explains this influential process and, at the same time, portrays one of the routes of the transfer of Muslims’ culture and philosophical thoughts to Europe and the quality of the formation of the institution of university during that time. Manuscript profile
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        5 - From Imaginal Faculty to Imagination: A Review of the Evolution of the Concept of Imagination in the Philosophical Systems of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā
        Ibrahim Bazargani
        Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of More
        Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of Muslim philosophers from Fārābī to Mullā Ṣadrā. It has even been used in responding to some kalāmī inquiries. Since the very beginning, Muslim philosophers have continuously devoted some of their studies to the investigation and explanation of the whatness and howness of the concept of imagination. However, this concept has not remained immune against change and has developed a distinct meaning in each philosophical system. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the three-fold schools of philosophy (Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist philosophy, and the Transcendent Philosophy) have each adopted a particular and different approach to this problem. The present study intends to examine the theories of some great figures of Islamic philosophy regarding the whatness of the faculty of imagination and reveal the existing differences among them. The findings indicate that philosophers’ views of the concept of imagination have not been fixed and similar in the course of history, and each has presented a specific and innovative explanation of this concept in conformity with their own philosophical system. For example, Fārābī considered this faculty to be a material component of the soul, while Mullā Ṣadrā changed it into the world of Ideas. This study was conducted following a descriptive-comparative method using library resources. Manuscript profile
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        6 - A Critique of the Theory of Transmigration and Shahrzūrī’s Demonstrative Arguments Based on Ibn Sīnā’s Principles
        Mahmud Saidiy
        The theory of the transmigration of the soul is one of the oldest views that has been propounded in the history of thought in order to explain the quality of reward or punishment of human beings and the nature of the eternity of the human soul. Shahrzūrī is one of the m More
        The theory of the transmigration of the soul is one of the oldest views that has been propounded in the history of thought in order to explain the quality of reward or punishment of human beings and the nature of the eternity of the human soul. Shahrzūrī is one of the most prominent Illuminationist philosophers, who has presented a coherent theory for the demonstration of ascending and descending transmigration. He has initially criticized Ibn Sīnā’s arguments on refuting the theory of transmigration and, then, provides some reasons to prove it. The present study demonstrates that Shahrzūrī’s criticisms of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments are wrong because, given the capability of the body, the active intellect grants the soul to the body. To prevent the soul’s lingering for doing acts, there must be a temporal concurrence and equality between the numbers of previous and new between-body states of the soul. Shahrzūrī’s arguments for proving the theory of transmigration are defective because the problems of the inhibition of the gathering of two souls in a body and the lack of concurrence and equality between the previous body of the soul and its next body still remain to be solved. Manuscript profile