A Critique of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s Criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s View of the Truth of Knowledge
Subject Areas : Etymology of philosophical terms
SeyedehZahra Mousavi Baygi
1
,
Vahid Khademzadeh
2
*
1 - PhD Candidate of Transcendent Philosophy, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran
2 - Assistant Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam Department, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran
Keywords: truth of knowledge, form, quality, relation, Ibn Sīnā, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī,
Abstract :
Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different occasions in many of his works. He has conceived of knowledge sometimes as pure quality, sometimes as quality possessing relation, and sometimes as pure relation. Moreover, he has interpreted knowledge as abstraction from matter in some of his works. Such a diversity of interpretations has given an excuse to some people such as Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī to criticize and question Ibn Sīnā’s view of the truth of knowledge. In different places in his works, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī emphasizes that Ibn Sīnā’s view of knowledge was divided, and he failed to attain a single standpoint concerning the truth of knowledge. The present study, which was conducted following an analytic-descriptive method and a critical approach, firstly presents Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim and, then, evaluates its truth. Next, the authors delve into his other works to examine the definitions of knowledge in his view. The findings of this study demonstrate that, although there are some fundamental problems in Ibn Sīnā’s view, his words are based on his own principles, are solid, and can be reduced to a unitary view. However, Rāzī’s words on this problem are inconsistent.