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        1 - Farabi and a Philosophical Reading of al-Huruf
        Ghasem  Purhassan
        The book al-Huruf has never been approached from a philosophical standpoint. Unlike the common belief, it is not a purely linguistic work and, rather, enjoys great significance regarding its philosophical aspect. Al-Huruf is considered to be one of the most important ph Full Text
        The book al-Huruf has never been approached from a philosophical standpoint. Unlike the common belief, it is not a purely linguistic work and, rather, enjoys great significance regarding its philosophical aspect. Al-Huruf is considered to be one of the most important philosophical works of Farabi, and most of the studies conducted on this book emphasize that it is merely a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. That is why Farabi’s innovations have been disregarded there. This book is of great importance not only because of its focus on linguistic principles but also because of its discussing the relationships between language and philosophy, religion and philosophy, and everyday language and philosophical language. Here, the writer also reveals the nature of the 200-year conflicts between kalam, philosophy, syntax, and logic in the world of Islam. The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze two fundamental principles and evaluate the related views. Therefore, the writer initially attends to the general and philosophical status and writing style of al-Huruf and explains the related ideas. This book is, first and foremost, a reaction to the enemies of philosophy and rationalist trends in understanding religion. Farabi begins the book with linguistic discussions and, then, in the light of his introduction, spells out the intricacies of logical and epistemological theories, and finally clarifies the nature of ontological thoughts. In this book, he discusses how ignoring fundamental linguistic principles could harm ontological and epistemological discussions. He also illustrates how linguistic studies could demystify philosophical principles and grant them more depth and essence. Second, in addition to examining the structure of al-Huruf, the writer tries to explore Farabi’s fundamental doctrine of reconciliation. In doing so, he begins with an analysis of the two schools of Kufa and Basrah and then reviews the mentioned doctrine. In the second part of this book, Farabi demonstrates in two chapters on the unity of philosophy and religion (al-Silah bayn al-falsafah wal millah) that there is no choice but to defend the doctrine of reconciliation. He emphasizes that an irrational religion is nothing but fantasy and maintains that the fundamental principles of religion are based on the intellect and reasoning. In his view, neither Abu Bishr nor Abu Saeid had grasped the significance of this view. Matta Ibn Yunus was not merely a representative of logic and wisdom; rather, he and his companions and advocates relied only on autonomous reasoning, which Farabi found insufficient. In contrast, Abu Saeid was not merely a representative of syntax as advocated by the School of Baghdad, but, in company with several people who defended a purely religious approach, he opposed the role of reason in understanding and justifying religious beliefs. In this book Farabi tries to pose and develop a third theory based on analyzing these two approaches. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        2 - Origin of Islamic Philosophy
        Ghasem  Purhassan
        The question of the nature of Islamic philosophy has triggered an extremely important conflict over a very long time. The quality of dealing with this question can play a determining role in our approach towards Islamic philosophy. Generally speaking, there are three ap Full Text
        The question of the nature of Islamic philosophy has triggered an extremely important conflict over a very long time. The quality of dealing with this question can play a determining role in our approach towards Islamic philosophy. Generally speaking, there are three approaches in this regard each deserving due attention and critical analysis. The first approach emphasizes the Greek origin of Islamic philosophy and considers it to be the extension of a philosophy which is called the Greek tradition. Advocates of this approach claim that all the philosophical trends in all periods have originated in or been influenced by Greek philosophy and must be studied in the light of the theory of linear continuity. According to this view, the assumption that rational thought has its origins in Iran, India, or China and also Babylon and Mesopotamia or Egypt is not much valid. The second approach insists that Islamic philosophy has no referent at all. The followers of this approach believe that, basically, all religious philosophies lack any kind of referent. They maintain that if we believe in Islamic philosophy, we will encounter some intricacies such as sacredness, contradiction, text interpretation, and the lack of growth and expansion of philosophy. This group claims that if we support the existence of Islamic philosophy, it would necessarily entail sacredness, and then any criticism of this kind of philosophy would be equal to a criticism of religion. However, this necessity is false. Regarding the problem of contradiction, it is claimed that it is not possible to reconcile the Qur’anic and traditional view of philosophy with that of the Greeks. Hence, the Greek view of happiness is in contrast to the Qur’anic one. The third approach emphasizes that Islamic philosophy is the expansion of Greek philosophy, and if we fail to provide a correct interpretation of their commensurability, we can never present a correct explanation of the nature of Islamic philosophy and its essential differences from Greek philosophy. That the number of philosophical problems in Greece was limited to 200 but increased to 700 during the Islamic period does not by itself provide a correct description of the nature of Islamic philosophy. Neither can it justify the Islamic nature of this kind of philosophy or defend it convincingly. The main point here is that the origin of Islamic philosophy is not Greek philosophy; rather, it is rooted in the Qur’anic verses, prophetic traditions, and religious prayers and texts. One cannot discuss the religious origin of Islamic philosophy based on the theory of the expansion of philosophical problems. There is a fundamental difference between a theory which considers Islamic philosophy to be rooted in Greece and limits the efforts of Muslim philosophers merely to increasing the number of philosophical topics and problems or adding variety to the related arguments or modifying or increasing them and a theory which asserts that Muslims, before becoming familiar with Greek philosophy, had already turned to rational thought. In doing so, they gradually set out to benefit from the philosophical knowledge of other nations and countries, particularly and mainly from that of Iranians, Indians, and Greeks. Therefore, the present paper intends to demonstrate that Islamic philosophy is rooted in the Qur’an and traditions. Manuscript Document
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        3 - Farabi and his Distinction between Existence and Quiddity
        Ghasem  Purhassan
        One of the innovations of Farabi and Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction between existence and quiddity. This view was merely developed in the light of understanding the meaning of the reality of being. Islamic philosophers, particularly Farabi and Ibn S Full Text
        One of the innovations of Farabi and Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction between existence and quiddity. This view was merely developed in the light of understanding the meaning of the reality of being. Islamic philosophers, particularly Farabi and Ibn Sina, because of their epistemological rupture with Greek tradition, sought to understand being differently from Aristotle and, in a way, abstained from reducing the question of being to the question of the whatness of objects. In addition to a conceptual and logical distinction, Farabi managed to develop and present an ontological distinction in the field of philosophy. Ibn Sina expanded it so vastly that some might consider this theory as one of his own philosophical achievements. After the problem of the evidence and principliality of existence, the quality of the relationship between existence and quiddity turned out to be one of the most important discussions in Islamic philosophy. At the beginning, under the influence of dividing being into necessary and possible types, Muslim philosophers tried to explain the fundamental difference between them through explaining the relationship between quiddity and existence. As a result, they considered two propositions as the basis of two interpretations of existence and the explanation of its relationship with quiddity. The theory of the synthetic nature of quiddative existents in terms of their existence and quiddity, the existence’s being superadded or accidental to quiddity, and the distinction between existence and quiddity in existents are the views that emerged in Islamic philosophy with Farabi and gradually came to the fore as the most important discussions concerning existence. Furthermore, Farabi’s discussion concerning the individuation of quiddities and the criterion for individuation, which was later accepted by all Islamic philosophers and emphasized by them, was developed under the influence of the above theories. In this paper, the writer has initially tried to provide a correct understanding of the theory of distinction through clarifying its fundamental bases. Then he has clarified its ontological and philosophical consequences and highlighted the importance of this theory in Islamic philosophy. Such an explanation necessitates an extensive investigation of Farabi’s ideas about existence, the meaning of existence, and the existence-quiddity relation. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        4 - Heidegger’s Interpretation of Anaximander’s Arche, Participation, and Time
        Ghasem  Purhassan Mehrdad Ahmadi
        Heidegger believed that a metaphysical conceptualization of the relationship between identity and difference is not original and maintained that such negligence is rooted in the fact that metaphysics has forgotten “difference as such” as pure unfoldedness. In his view, Full Text
        Heidegger believed that a metaphysical conceptualization of the relationship between identity and difference is not original and maintained that such negligence is rooted in the fact that metaphysics has forgotten “difference as such” as pure unfoldedness. In his view, the Greeks had a clearer image of the above-mentioned relationship. In his interpretation of Anaximander’s view, Heidegger demonstrates that, while viewing all being as a whole, Anaximander does not ignore the differences among them. Based on Heidegger’s interpretation, through introducing apeiron and time as two fundamental elements, Anaximander managed to have an early encounter with the relationship between identity and difference. Heidegger called this relationship “participation” and maintained that this concept can lead one to fundamental difference. This is because, unlike metaphysical theories, it does not depend on external elements, upon which correlation relies; rather, it depends on the being of beings. Apeiron and time open the door to a pure space in the unfoldedness of which beings find their essence and, at the same time, depend so much on each other that the whole is created based on their mutual relation. Manuscript Document
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        5 - A Study of the Fundamental Principles and Elements of Comparative Philosophy in Izutsu’s Philosophy
        Hamidreza Eskandari Ghasem  Purhassan
        Due to the dominance of the theory of analogy and Henry Corbin’s phenomenological approach, comparative philosophy has not yet been properly explored. In Iran, no reference has ever been made to Toshihiko Izutsu and his meta-historical theory, and no study has ever been Full Text
        Due to the dominance of the theory of analogy and Henry Corbin’s phenomenological approach, comparative philosophy has not yet been properly explored. In Iran, no reference has ever been made to Toshihiko Izutsu and his meta-historical theory, and no study has ever been conducted in this regard. Izutsu’s meta-historical view is a fundamental departure from Paul Masson-Oursel’s approach and even historicism. However, it is considered to be an innovative view which demands more accurate deliberation. Accordingly, the present study was conducted to explore the elements and fundamental principles of comparative philosophy in Izutsu’s thoughts. In doing so, the authors have examined the importance and place of Izutsu in comparative philosophy, the nature of comparative philosophy, the necessity and possibility of comparative philosophy, and Europe-centeredness in Izutsu’s philosophy. They aim to clarify how one can discover the necessity and possibility of comparative philosophy based on his principles and, at the same time, remain immune against the criticisms advanced against other comparative philosophical approaches. Manuscript Document
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        6 - Ibn Sina and the Problem of the Immortality of the Soul
        Ghasem  Purhassan
        Unlike the prevailing idea, Ibn Sina is neither a loyal advocate of Aristotle nor a mere commentator of his ideas. He is an independent, distinguished, and Muslim Iranian philosopher. In the light of the criticisms targeted at Greek philosophy and Aristotle’s ideas, Ibn Full Text
        Unlike the prevailing idea, Ibn Sina is neither a loyal advocate of Aristotle nor a mere commentator of his ideas. He is an independent, distinguished, and Muslim Iranian philosopher. In the light of the criticisms targeted at Greek philosophy and Aristotle’s ideas, Ibn Sina intended to develop a new form of epistemology and lay the foundations of oriental philosophy. One of the controversial issues among thinkers is the problem of the soul and its trans-substantiality, immateriality, and immortality. Ibn Sina considers Aristotle’s ideas in this regard to be inadequate and contaminated with defects, mistakes, and confusion. Through criticizing Aristotle’s definition of the soul, Ibn Sina tries to introduce a novel approach to the problem of the soul, while rejecting the arguments of survival and finally devising a new theory concerning the immortality of the soul. The purpose of the present paper is to explore Aristotle’s ideas and Ibn Sina’s objections to them and also reveal the latter philosopher’s innovative ideas concerning the problem of the soul. The writer tries to demonstrate that Ibn Sina’s achievement regarding the issue of the soul and body is, in fact, a new solution to this problem. He also aims to show that it is a mistake to assume that Islamic philosophers still continue to follow Aristotle’s ideas. Ibn Sina must be considered as a pioneer in fundamental arguments on the subject of the soul and its immateriality. Manuscript Document