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  1 - Qadi Kamal al-Din Hossein Ibn Mo‘in al-Din Meybodi: Life, Character, Views
  Alireza   Javanmardi Adib Maghsoud  Mohammadi
  Hossein Ibn Mo‘in al-Din Meybodi, nicknamed Kamal al-Din, known as Qadi, with Mantiqi as his pen-name, is one of the great figures and distinguished scientific, literary, and philosophical characters of the land of Iran. He was born in Meybod in Yazd Province in the nin More

  Hossein Ibn Mo‘in al-Din Meybodi, nicknamed Kamal al-Din, known as Qadi, with Mantiqi as his pen-name, is one of the great figures and distinguished scientific, literary, and philosophical characters of the land of Iran. He was born in Meybod in Yazd Province in the ninth century (AH). After learning the common preliminary intellectual and transmitted sciences of his time, he went to Shiraz in his youth and became a student of Dawani. Meybodi is a Muslim philosopher, an advocate of Shafi‘i school of thought, and a man of Tawalla (loving the People of the Prophet’s House). His love of the Commander of the Faithful (a) and the Pure and Infallible Household is so profound that some have considered him to be a Shi‘ite scholar. During the reign of Sultan Y‘aqub Aq Qoyunlu, he was a judge and the custodian of endowments of Yazd and its suburbs. His most important works include Sharh-i hidayah al-hikmah, Sharh-i diwan mansub bi Amir al-mu’minin (a), and Munsha’at. During the reign of Shah Isma‘il Safavi, when Mohammad Karra (ruler of Abarqu) captured the city of Yazd, Meybodi became his minister and, between 909 and 911 AH, when Shah Isma‘il recaptured Yazd, he was murdered on the King’s order. Meybodi believed that Illuminationists and Sufis (gnostics) were superior to theologians and Peripatetics and considered Peripatetic philosophy, which is based on rational deduction and reasoning, an immensely uncertain and ambiguous school which exhausts the intellect in the process of perceiving its fundamental principles. Unlike Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Ibn Arabi, he was not the founder of a specific school of philosophy. However, given his accurate criticisms, investigations, and particular views regarding topics which interested theologians, Peripatetics, gnostics, and Illuminationists in the mould of a number of independent and dependent (commentaries and glosses) works, as a connecting link, he managed not only to play a significant role in developing Islamic philosophy and bringing the different philosophical trends and schools of his time together, but also become a source of inspiration for Mulla Sadra in developing the Transcendent Philosophy. Manuscript profile
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  2 - Historical Development of the Concept of Hyle (Matter) in the Works of Muslim Thinkers
  Mahmoud  Hedayatafza Mohammad Javad   Rezaeirah
  As generally acknowledged, the term “hyle” in Peripatetic philosophy has been derived from Aristotle’s views on matter and form or potency and act. Although this term has been defined as “matter lacking actuality and enjoying pure potency” in Islamic philosophy, a study More

  As generally acknowledged, the term “hyle” in Peripatetic philosophy has been derived from Aristotle’s views on matter and form or potency and act. Although this term has been defined as “matter lacking actuality and enjoying pure potency” in Islamic philosophy, a study of the works of Muslim thinkers reveals that, because of the integration of some philosophical views with gnostic ideas as well as the influence of Islamic teachings, this term has undergone different semantic changes. As a result, in some schools of philosophy, it has been consciously employed to refer to actual affairs. Below, the writers have provided eight meanings for “hyle”, which are listed in their chronological order of formulation: 1. Matter lacking any kind of actuality and enjoying pure potency, as accepted by Peripatetic philosophers and equivalent to its Aristotelian concept. 2. The fourth level of being, for the Isma‘ilite, which is posterior to the soul and prior to nature. 3. Pure substantial continuity, in some of Suhrawardi’s works, which, along with accidental quantity, constitutes the truth of body. 4. Matter inclusive of all possible worlds and an otherworldly expression of simple existence in the view of some gnostics. 5. One of the modes of form in line with Mulla Sadra’s view of the unitary integration of matter and form. 6. An equivalent to possible existence or created thing’s divine aspect (Face of God) in the view of Shaykh Ihsa’ei. 7. An expansion of the Aristotelian concept of prime hyle under the title of the dark nature of essence in Tafkik (separation) School. 8. An application of the matter of world to the element of water based on the religious texts of Tafkik School of thought. Manuscript profile
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  3 - Happiness and Contemplation of Beauty in Plato’s Symposium
  Hamidreza  Mahboobi Arani
  Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is one of the most important parts of his works. The present paper exclusively examines the last of Diotima’s speech, where Plato uses some words and phrases focusing on the relationship between happiness and contemplation of beauty More

  Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is one of the most important parts of his works. The present paper exclusively examines the last of Diotima’s speech, where Plato uses some words and phrases focusing on the relationship between happiness and contemplation of beauty. Diotima claims that, only when a philosopher or lover (here, in love with Sophia) reaches the peak of his love and begins his contemplation of beauty, he could attain knowledge, happiness, and true eternity, but the question is, “How could this claim be interpreted?” The purpose of the author in this paper is to attract the attention of readers to the interpretive point that Plato’s understanding of the meaning of contemplation of beauty should be perceived in the context of an ethical and political program and in relation to the practical life of a citizen rather than within a purely abstract and theoretical inferential framework. The first part of this paper explains the intended problem through an investigation of different sections of Diotima’s speech. In the second part, with particular attention to Alcibiades’ speech, the author demonstrates that, in order to learn about Plato’s understanding of this problem, one must pay particular attention to the various dimensions of this speech. Finally, he concludes the paper by presenting an interpretation of Diotima’s last words based on a general reading of Symposium and, specifically, Alcibiades’ character and words. Manuscript profile
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  4 - A Critique of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s Criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s View of the Truth of Knowledge
  SeyedehZahra Mousavi Baygi Vahid Khademzadeh
  20.1001.1.20089589.1400.12.3.4.4
  Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different More

  Although Muslim Philosophers have not specifically discussed epistemological problems, they have extensively spoken of some general issues regarding knowledge. Ibn Sīnā has provided various definitions and explanations in relation to the nature of knowledge on different occasions in many of his works. He has conceived of knowledge sometimes as pure quality, sometimes as quality possessing relation, and sometimes as pure relation. Moreover, he has interpreted knowledge as abstraction from matter in some of his works. Such a diversity of interpretations has given an excuse to some people such as Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī to criticize and question Ibn Sīnā’s view of the truth of knowledge. In different places in his works, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī emphasizes that Ibn Sīnā’s view of knowledge was divided, and he failed to attain a single standpoint concerning the truth of knowledge. The present study, which was conducted following an analytic-descriptive method and a critical approach, firstly presents Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim and, then, evaluates its truth. Next, the authors delve into his other works to examine the definitions of knowledge in his view. The findings of this study demonstrate that, although there are some fundamental problems in Ibn Sīnā’s view, his words are based on his own principles, are solid, and can be reduced to a unitary view. However, Rāzī’s words on this problem are inconsistent. Manuscript profile