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        1 - Function of the Intellect in the Realms of Religion and Ethics in Qadi Abduljabbar Mu‘tazili
        Farzaneh  Mustafapour Hossein  Hooshanghi Seyyed Abbas  Zahabi
        This paper examines the functions of theoretical and practical intellects in the fields of religion and ethics in the view of Qadi Abduljabbar Mu‘tazili. Based on what appears from his views regarding the explanation of ethical propositions, we can refer to three episte More
        This paper examines the functions of theoretical and practical intellects in the fields of religion and ethics in the view of Qadi Abduljabbar Mu‘tazili. Based on what appears from his views regarding the explanation of ethical propositions, we can refer to three epistemological, motivational, and ontological approaches. The writers have investigated three categories in the field of epistemology: knowledge of fundamental values, goodness and ugliness of acts, and unveiling of ethical principles based on basic propositions; two functions of the intellect in the field of motivation: the origin of human ethical implications and the basis of Man’s responsibility, and the human voluntary and rational choice in the field of ontology. He maintains that the intellect plays an essential and fundamental role in each of them, and that moral principles have been explained based on rational reasoning. Regarding the functions of the intellect in the domain of understanding religion, the writers initially deal with God’s Oneness and Justice in the light of rational reason and, then, relying on religious principles and through granting a central role to the intellect, they interpret some Qur’anic verses. Finally, they try to interpret some cases which are in contrast to the intellect with reference to certain examples. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Socrates’ Approach and Our Approach (Socrates’ Historical Views of Iran and Iranians)
        Seyyed Musa  Dibaj
        Previously, in a paper entitled Iranian Thought in Socratic Thought (presented in the “Conference on Commemorating Socrates, the Greek Philosopher”, Tehran, 2001), the writer of the present paper argued that in Plato’s dialogues, the rights of Iranians and the Iranian g More
        Previously, in a paper entitled Iranian Thought in Socratic Thought (presented in the “Conference on Commemorating Socrates, the Greek Philosopher”, Tehran, 2001), the writer of the present paper argued that in Plato’s dialogues, the rights of Iranians and the Iranian government have not been clearly stipulated. Socrates, who expected Iranians to officially recognize the government of Athens, does not explicitly talk about the official or de facto recognition of the Achaemenid government. Plato has spoken about the poets, playwrights, and historiographers of other nations, particularly those of Iranians, more freely than other Greek thinkers and scholars. However, he does not believe that Athenians’ democratic rights are conditioned by protecting the rights of other nations, including Iranians and Egyptians, and recognizing the legitimacy of their governments. The present paper is intended to define and review the features of Athenian self-knowledge and Iranian self-knowledge and compare them with each other. As Socrates himself considers it justified, strangers can also discuss the nature of “terms”, including the description of the characteristics of the Greeks. As we know, once Phaedrus told Socrates, “Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.” In this paper, the writer does not intend to copy Socrates’ approach in this regard; neither does he intend to provide a mythical, narrative, or historical account of the conditions of Greece during the time of this philosopher. Rather, he seeks to extensively explain and interpret his political view of Iran, specifically with reference to Alcibiades and Laws dialogues. Manuscript profile
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        3 - An Analytic Study of the Development of Philosophical Intelligibles from Farabi to Mulla Sadra
        Seyyed Mohammadali  Dibaji Zeynab  Yusefzadeh
        This paper examines the epistemology of the secondary intelligible, in general, and the quality of the truth of philosophical secondary intelligibles, in particular. It does so relying on an analytic study of the modes of the “accidence” and “qualification” of the secon More
        This paper examines the epistemology of the secondary intelligible, in general, and the quality of the truth of philosophical secondary intelligibles, in particular. It does so relying on an analytic study of the modes of the “accidence” and “qualification” of the secondary intelligibles in the views of such great philosophers as Farabi, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. The results of the present study indicate that all the above thinkers argue for the prevention of epistemological errors in the light of a clear explanation of the ontological existence of secondary philosophical intelligibles in the outside. Nevertheless, each of them has pursued a different approach towards attaining his goal based on his own philosophy. Finally, the writers conclude that Mulla Sadra’s epistemological analysis of philosophical intelligibles is a great step towards justifying the presence of such intelligibles in the outside. His analysis in this regard ultimately leads to his idea of the principiality of existence. Manuscript profile
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        4 - A Comparative Study of Ibn Sina and Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi on God’s Knowledge
        Einollah  Khademi Mahmood  Ahesteh
        God’s Knowledge is one of the important philosophical problems whose various dimensions have continually been explored by different thinkers. In order to avoid the problem of change in divine essence, Ibn Sina argues that God’s Knowledge of particulars is possible throu More
        God’s Knowledge is one of the important philosophical problems whose various dimensions have continually been explored by different thinkers. In order to avoid the problem of change in divine essence, Ibn Sina argues that God’s Knowledge of particulars is possible through the knowledge of universals and causes. He also holds that the divine undifferentiated knowledge of existents is possible through imprinted forms. On the other hand, Muhaqqiq Tusi considers the necessary knowledge to belong to the category of relation and maintains that, in the Necessary Being’s Knowledge of changing particular affairs, some changes occur in the relation while the essence remains the same. Therefore, unlike Ibn Sina, Tusi accepts God’s Knowledge of particulars. He also criticizes Ibn Sina’s theory of the imprinting of established forms in the essence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sina argues that the knowledge of divine essence through His Essence and the essential knowledge of imprinted forms, which is the cause of the appearance of existence, are of the presential type, while the differentiated knowledge of other existents is of the acquired type. In this paper, the writers explain and explore the philosophical principles of these two thinkers. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Moving from Anselm’s and Descartes’ Arguments to another Version of the Conceptual Argument on the Existence of God
        Amir  Divani
        The conceptual argument which is called the “ontological argument” in Western philosophy moves from a concept in the mind to its external referent. This argument is only about a concept which exclusively applies to God. Philosophers unanimously concede that the move fro More
        The conceptual argument which is called the “ontological argument” in Western philosophy moves from a concept in the mind to its external referent. This argument is only about a concept which exclusively applies to God. Philosophers unanimously concede that the move from the (mere) concept to the referent is not allowed; at the same time, they agree that the concept representing God, like the existence of God, which is unique and different from that of any other existent, is different from all other concepts and has no parallel among them. Anselm and Descartes have presented the conceptual argument in different ways. Irrespective of the truth or falsity of the leveled criticisms against these two arguments, the present paper suggests another version of this argument (conceptual argument) which, under the necessary conditions, will attain its end more conveniently. This concept enjoys certain features, among which representation is of great importance. The intended concept is the same concept of existence; an intelligible concept which is a part of the nature of the intellect and stands at a distance from any kind of association with whatness and non-existence. After interpreting this argument and exploring the writings of Muslim philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, the author concludes that some of his words could be used as proof for the truth of this claim. If this argument yields fruit, it demonstrates not only the general capability of the intellect in knowing God and His Attributes but also the possibility of providing a new version of some of the objectives of the great figures in the fields of philosophy and gnosis. Manuscript profile
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        6 - A Semantic Study of the Description of God as the Simple Intellect in Sinan Wisdom (with Reference to Three Different Interpretations by Fakhr al-Din Razi, Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra)
        SAYYED MOHAMMAD ENTEZAM
        Ibn Sina referred to God as the Simple Intellect; however, his intended meaning of this term has been interpreted differently by Fakhr al-Din Razi, Mir Damad, and Mulla Sadra. Fakhr al-Din Razi believes that the Sinan Simple Intellect depends on the suddenness and non-t More
        Ibn Sina referred to God as the Simple Intellect; however, his intended meaning of this term has been interpreted differently by Fakhr al-Din Razi, Mir Damad, and Mulla Sadra. Fakhr al-Din Razi believes that the Sinan Simple Intellect depends on the suddenness and non-temporality of God’s acquired and differentiated knowledge of existents prior to their creation. According to Mir Damad, this term denotes that God’s knowledge of existents is at the level of essence and identical with essence. He believes that this kind of knowledge is in contrast to His presential knowledge of existents and argues that the attribution of acquired knowledge to Ibn Sina is among Suhrawardi’s mistakes. Finally, Mulla Sadra states that, by the Simple Intellect, Ibn Sina means a general rather than differentiated type of acquired knowledge. In this paper, the author examines each of these interpretations along with their related proofs and, at the end, demonstrates that the correct interpretation of this term is a combination of those provided by Mulla Sadra and Fakhr al-Din Razi. Manuscript profile
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        7 - Origins of the Notion of Bahman or Suhrawardi’s First Emanated
        Nadia  Maftouni Morteza  Darrudi Jawan
        The views of Suhrawardi can be traced in the philosophy of ancient Iran. One of such views was the belief in Bahman or the first emanated. Following the method of content analysis, the authors have extracted and examined the overt and covert effects of Bahman, which is More
        The views of Suhrawardi can be traced in the philosophy of ancient Iran. One of such views was the belief in Bahman or the first emanated. Following the method of content analysis, the authors have extracted and examined the overt and covert effects of Bahman, which is considered to be the most supreme manifestation of Ahura Mazda in the view of Zoroastrians, in Suhrawardi’s works. After deducing the general and specific features of Bahman based on Zoroastrian sources, such as Avesta and Bundahishn, they have tried to locate them in Suhrawardi’s books. Following a thorough study of all of his works, they have extracted and counted all the direct references to Amesha Spenta and all the cases referring to the general and particular features of Bahman. After calculating the related frequencies, they have carried out a content analysis and conceptual study of the existing features and signs. The findings of this study reveal the number of direct references to AmeshaSpentaBahman in the studied texts. Moreover, they show that the term Bahman is used in the same sense as the first emanated or the First Intellect and, in contrast to other AmeshaSpenta, as the head of vertical intellects based on their archetypal functions. The writers also conclude that Suhrawardi’s books contain the largest collection of references to Bahman among all Persian texts, while reminiscing some of the Iranian mythological heroes. Among the general and particular features of Bahman or the first emanated, its unity with other AmeshaSpenta has the highest frequency. This is because all signs of AmeshaSpenta enjoy this characteristic, the outcomes of which include the coexistence of all signs of AmeshaSpenta with each other and the organization dominating them. This finding by itself demonstrates that Suhrawardi pays particular attention to the meanings and functions of AmeshaSpenta in his works. Manuscript profile
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        8 - Humanism in Sophists and Great Greek Philosophers:A Study of their Common and Different Ideas
        Hasan  Bolkhari Qahi Mina  Muhammedi Vakil
        The Sophists were the first ancient thinkers who considered the issue of man as the main subject of philosophy. They were the first to change the direction of philosophical research from phusis to nomos. Almost at the same time and a short while after the rise of the So More
        The Sophists were the first ancient thinkers who considered the issue of man as the main subject of philosophy. They were the first to change the direction of philosophical research from phusis to nomos. Almost at the same time and a short while after the rise of the Sophists, in spite of their disagreements with and fundamental oppositions to these thinkers, Socrates, Plato, and also Aristotle introduced man as the primary concern of philosophical theories. This was the main commonality between the views of the Sophists and ancient philosophers. On the other hand, there is also a kind of formal proximity between Socrates and the Sophists in terms of their method of dialectics and discourse. However, since Socrates considers a fixed criterion for knowledge which is free from sense impressions, he criticizes Protagoras’ statement as to “Man is the measure of all things”, and argues that Protagoras focuses on individual man and considers the truth to be relative. In this way, a comparative study of the ideas of the Sophists and philosophers reveals that both groups followed the same subject and method but had different purposes. The Sophists’ purpose was teaching, while philosophers sought their end in knowing the truth. This paper aims to discover the differences and similarities between these two approaches. In doing so, it initially deliberates accurately over their distinctive ideas and then clearly explains that some of the philosophical findings of the Sophists, in spite of their historical notoriety, have exercised some lasting effects on contemporary philosophy. In other words, by changing the direction of philosophy’s attention to the problem of man, in a sense, they developed the basis for modern philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        9 - Theoretical Changes about the Faculty of Estimation in the Course of Historical Development of Islamic Philosophy
        Mohammad-Ali  Ardestani
        The faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meani More
        The faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meanings has placed it on top of all inner particular powers. Following a descriptive-analytic evaluation method, the present paper examines the development of the views of Muslim philosophers in this regard. Three important theories stand out in this process. In their quest to attribute a specific source to each kind of perception, Peripatetic philosophers consider the faculty of estimation to be independent from others, place it alongside the faculties of sensation, imagination, and intellect, and emphasize that it can perceive the nature of all specific universals. Accordingly, perceptions are divided in two four sensory, imaginative, estimative, and rational types. Among the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy, some philosophers such as Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī have advocated the Peripatetics on this ground, but Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī have criticized this theory each in their own way. Mullā Ṣadrā has promoted the faculty of estimation to the level of the intellect and placed it at the level of revealed intellect. Accordingly, perceptions are divided into three sensory, imaginative, and rational types. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has attributed the faculty of estimation to the common sense and demoted its status to the level of the senses. He acknowledges the unity of sensory, imaginative, and estimative perceptions. Manuscript profile
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        10 - The Systematic Method of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in Confronting Critics of Islamic Philosophy
        Hesamal-din  Momeni Shahraki
        Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī can be considered one of the most prominent advocates of Islamic philosophy during the period of eclipse of thought and philosophizing. He prevented the extinction of the light of this original school of thought drawing on his scientific and ph More
        Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī can be considered one of the most prominent advocates of Islamic philosophy during the period of eclipse of thought and philosophizing. He prevented the extinction of the light of this original school of thought drawing on his scientific and philosophical support and efforts. In order to defend Islamic philosophy against its critics, he used a systematic method that resulted in a fundamental transformation in the development of Islamic philosophy and kalām. While employing some descriptive, analytic, and ascriptive arguments and certain logical and deductive analytic methods, the present study aims to explain Ṭūsī’s scientific-defensive method in facing the critics of Islamic philosophy. The findings of this study indicate that the features of his systematic method include explaining the lack of conflict of interest between philosophy and religion, entering dialogs with other thinkers, explaining Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy, criticizing the views of opponents of philosophy, synthesizing Peripatetic and Illuminationst philosophies, revealing the functions of philosophy through presenting philosophical explanations, following a rational and unbiased approach in commenting and criticism, and observing the rules of ethics in criticism. Finally, the author concludes that Ṭūsī’s philosophical intellect and rational approach provide the basis and main axis for his scientific-defensive system. Manuscript profile