The immateriality of the soul has always been one of the important psychological discussions in Islamic philosophy and given rise to various related theories. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the problem more than any other philosopher and claims to have some innovative views More
The immateriality of the soul has always been one of the important psychological discussions in Islamic philosophy and given rise to various related theories. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the problem more than any other philosopher and claims to have some innovative views regarding the imaginal immateriality of the soul. Here, the author intends to criticize Mullā Ṣadrā’s view based on a study of the views of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā claims that he is the first to have provided a theory on the immateriality of the soul; however, a study of the works of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī reveals that this theory has indeed a longer history than what Mullā Ṣadrā attests. Ibn Sīnā’s words on the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul are quite clear; nevertheless, they raise some doubt concerning the imaginal immateriality of the soul. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā adduce two different reasons to prove this immateriality. However, Mullā Ṣadrā has also demonstrated imaginal and super rational immateriality of the soul and rejected some of Ibn Sīnā’s reasons about the immateriality of the soul. The present paper criticizes Mullā Ṣadrā’s view and approach in this regard.
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The theory of the transmigration of the soul is one of the oldest views that has been propounded in the history of thought in order to explain the quality of reward or punishment of human beings and the nature of the eternity of the human soul. Shahrzūrī is one of the m More
The theory of the transmigration of the soul is one of the oldest views that has been propounded in the history of thought in order to explain the quality of reward or punishment of human beings and the nature of the eternity of the human soul. Shahrzūrī is one of the most prominent Illuminationist philosophers, who has presented a coherent theory for the demonstration of ascending and descending transmigration. He has initially criticized Ibn Sīnā’s arguments on refuting the theory of transmigration and, then, provides some reasons to prove it. The present study demonstrates that Shahrzūrī’s criticisms of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments are wrong because, given the capability of the body, the active intellect grants the soul to the body. To prevent the soul’s lingering for doing acts, there must be a temporal concurrence and equality between the numbers of previous and new between-body states of the soul. Shahrzūrī’s arguments for proving the theory of transmigration are defective because the problems of the inhibition of the gathering of two souls in a body and the lack of concurrence and equality between the previous body of the soul and its next body still remain to be solved.
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