Presently, historicism is the dominant approach in interpreting philosophical traditions. This approach considers each science, particularly philosophy, to be in some way related to the specific lifetime of thinkers. Within this framework, historicist interpreters exami
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Presently, historicism is the dominant approach in interpreting philosophical traditions. This approach considers each science, particularly philosophy, to be in some way related to the specific lifetime of thinkers. Within this framework, historicist interpreters examine Plato’s works in relation to four different periods, with the dialogue of Laws belonging to the latest period of his life, indicating a change in his approach. However, in opposition to any kind of historicist view, Leo Strauss disagrees with this division and believes that there is no change of direction in Plato’s overall philosophy – from the first to the last dialogue – and all of them address philosophical problems from a specific standpoint. We encounter this comprehensive approach also in Strauss’ reading of the dialogue of Laws. In fact, Strauss believes that, in order to grasp a real understanding of the dialogue of Laws, one must follow his method and consider Fārābī’s interpretation of this work in Talkhīṣ al-nawāmīs as a basis. Strauss also maintains that it is the only way through which one can go beyond the limits of historical interpretation. While providing a brief discussion of the historical interpretation of the Laws, the purpose of the present study is to examine Fārābī’s interpretation of the dialogue of Laws, Strauss’ critique and view of this interpretation, and the most distinctive features of Strauss’ innovative interpretation of this dialogue.
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