• Home
  • Malek Hosseini
    • List of Articles Malek Hosseini

      • Open Access Article

        1 - Epistemological Place of Phronesis and its Importance in Aristotle’s Philosophy of Ethics
        Ali Nazemi Ardakani Reza Davari Ardakani Malek Hosseini
        Phronesis or practical wisdom is one of the intellectual virtues which Aristotle has defined as a predisposition for continuously becoming involved in practice while thinking wisely about good and evil affairs. The outcome of this predisposition or phronetic act is the Full Text
        Phronesis or practical wisdom is one of the intellectual virtues which Aristotle has defined as a predisposition for continuously becoming involved in practice while thinking wisely about good and evil affairs. The outcome of this predisposition or phronetic act is the product of a kind of philosophical thinking which, in addition to viewing certain established principles, attends to madīna (polis) as a cradle for the development of acts; to finite, particular, and changing affairs as the subject of knowledge, and to Man as a free agent. The irregularity and, at the same time, legitimacy of phronesis provides individuals with a strategy not to surrender to fixed and strict scientific laws as the only legitimate tools of knowledge acquisition. Through making a methodological distinction between sophia or theoretical wisdom and phronesis, Aristotle has in fact founded the independence and irreducibility of practico-ethical knowledge about what is correct; practical deliberation cannot be reduced to logical arguments. In Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, accidental knowledge, as the knowledge of finite, particular, possible, and changing affairs, is a complement to essential knowledge, which pertains to pre-eternal and universal affairs and primal and fixed basic principles. Sophia and phronesis can lead to happiness only in case they function as the two sides of the same coin. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        2 - Priority of Sophia to Phronesis and its Significance in Aristotle’s Philosophy of Ethics
        Ali Nazemi Ardakani Reza Davari Ardakani Malek Hosseini
        The relationship between phronesis or practical wisdom and Sophia or theoretical wisdom and, at another level, the relationship between ethical virtues and intellectual virtues are among the important subjects in Aristotle’s philosophy of ethics. Their importance is due Full Text
        The relationship between phronesis or practical wisdom and Sophia or theoretical wisdom and, at another level, the relationship between ethical virtues and intellectual virtues are among the important subjects in Aristotle’s philosophy of ethics. Their importance is due to the fact that not only in case of the priority of phronesis to sophia, contradiction will arise between Aristotle’s teachings in Metaphysics and Nichomachean Ethics, but also because it seems that such a priority will eventually lead to a kind of diversion from prime philosophy and, hence, considering human being as the noblest subject in philosophy. Of course, Aristotle himself disagrees with this position. This paper mainly inquires whether in Aristotle’s philosophy priority belongs to sophia or phronesis, and what the significance and consequences of the priority of one over the other is. The authors argue that, although phronesis has a supreme place in his philosophy, it is sophia which enjoys fundamental priority. On the other hand, in Aristotle’s system of thought, eudaimonia or the highest human good cannot be attained unless through possessing phronesis and Sophia at the same time. Hence, it seems that, in order to learn about the ultimate goal of philosophy, it is necessary to further deliberate over the concepts of sophia and phronesis and their relationships with each other and with other virtues. Manuscript Document