One of the most important and accurate problems in Fārābī’s epistemological philosophy is the question of perception and its relationship with the soul, reason, and ontological promotion. In sharp contrast to Aristotle, Fārābī challenges the theory of the passivity of t
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One of the most important and accurate problems in Fārābī’s epistemological philosophy is the question of perception and its relationship with the soul, reason, and ontological promotion. In sharp contrast to Aristotle, Fārābī challenges the theory of the passivity of the soul in perception, considers the soul to be the creator of perception and, in this way, founds the theory of the soul as an active agent. This theory has influenced the ideas of all the philosophers after him in the field of Islamic philosophy, from Ibn Sīnā to ‘Allamāh Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Fārābī connects perception with manifestation and presence, which are mainly discussed in the philosophical schools of Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā and defends it from the view point of ontology. Some of Fārābī’s innovations include acknowledging the creativity of the soul in perception, granting a graded nature to perception and knowledge, paying attention to the emergent and ontological mode of knowledge, understanding the generous and giving nature of knowledge alongside attaching fundamental importance to sense perception, criticizing non-certain types of knowledge and presenting a fundamental view regarding certain knowledge and, finally, introducing perception as a process. Following a comparative approach, the present study examines the problem of perception and its nature in Fārābī’s philosophy, while considering the views of other Muslim philosophers, and portrays the significance of his theory of perception.
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