List of articles (by subject) Comparative studies in the field of history of philosophy
-
Open Access Article
1 - A Critique of Innate Ideas in Descartes’ Philosophy Based on Sadrian Principles
Maryam Samadieh عبدالرزاق حسامی فرDescartes believed in the existence of innate ideas in human beings. He maintained that the idea of God is the most important of such ideas which He, similar to a dexterous craftsman, has imprinted on our primordial nature (fitrah). The interpreters of Cartesian philoso MoreDescartes believed in the existence of innate ideas in human beings. He maintained that the idea of God is the most important of such ideas which He, similar to a dexterous craftsman, has imprinted on our primordial nature (fitrah). The interpreters of Cartesian philosophy have adopted various methods to interpret the place of innate ideas in Descartes’ philosophy. Based on one of these interpretations, these ideas potentially exist and are present in the soul prior to experiencing them, and their appearance and actuality comes after their sense perception. However, based on another interpretation, the innateness of ideas does not necessarily indicate their permanent presence in the mind as, in this case, no idea can ever be innate. Rather, it means that we are capable of creating such ideas and can perceive their truth through sufficient mental and rational contemplation and needless of the knowledge acquired through the senses. It seems that the first interpretation conforms more to Descartes’ own view as to the potential existence and presence of such ideas. Accordingly, it is inferred that the existence of innate ideas in its Cartesian sense is not consistent with Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles because he denies the existence of any kind of concept and judgement prior to experiencing them in the mind. Moreover, based on Sadrian principles, the human soul is a corporeal substance void of any kind of concept and judgement at the beginning of its creation, but it gradually develops through its trans-substantial motion until it reaches the level of intellectual immateriality. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
2 - Nature in the Views of Greek and Muslim Philosophers
داود محمدیانیUndoubtedly, nature has always attracted the attention of scientists and philosophers as the loci of the genesis and growth of natural existents and its current. Scientists working in the field of empirical sciences mainly seek the knowledge of natural existents and law MoreUndoubtedly, nature has always attracted the attention of scientists and philosophers as the loci of the genesis and growth of natural existents and its current. Scientists working in the field of empirical sciences mainly seek the knowledge of natural existents and laws of nature, while philosophers basically deal with the knowledge of nature itself and its structure and try to provide an answer to the questions of what the meaning of nature is, what its structure is, what relationship exists between existents and nature, whether nature is the primary source of the appearance of existents in the world, and whether nature, as matter and form, is a cradle for the appearance of various forms of existents. Greek philosophers and, later, Muslim philosophers have provided various responses to these questions. In ancient Greek philosophy, physis or nature means growth, living, and life. This meaning, which had provided the basis for pre-Socratic philosophy, changed into the “content of the world” and “maker of things” in Stoic philosophy. Plato also defined physis as the origin of the appearance of all things. He used the words technē (art) and archē (origin) to explain the emergence of the world and considered the creation of the world as an artistic innovation. Aristotle, who viewed the world synonymous with the whole nature, believed that nature is the source of motion and change in things; however, Muslim thinkers have provided various ideas about nature. Ikhwān al-Ṣafā maintained that nature is the fifth level of the levels of being and the “active” aspect of the world, with matter as its passive aspect. Ibn Sīnā considered nature and the interactions therein as God’s act and believed that nature is the cause of the appearance of corporeal substance by synthesizing matter and form. Unlike the Peripatetics, who believed that archetypes are the same as the nature of things, Suhrawardī rejected archetypes and replaced them with luminary nature. Finally, Mullā Ṣadrā viewed the world of nature identical with renewal and change and maintained that the nature of substance enjoys permanent motion and flow. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
3 - A Critique of the Theory of the End of Comparative Philosophy Based on Steven Burik’s View
Maryam Parvizi Ghasem PourhasanSince the coinage of the term “comparative philosophy” several views have been propounded concerning its whatness, principles, and function. Some thinkers emphasize the end of comparative philosophy, and some others insist on its significance and necessity. There are st MoreSince the coinage of the term “comparative philosophy” several views have been propounded concerning its whatness, principles, and function. Some thinkers emphasize the end of comparative philosophy, and some others insist on its significance and necessity. There are still others who advocate the beginning of some basic changes in this school from Europe-centeredness to interaction and dialog with others. However, the word “end” has different meanings the investigation of which could lead to three main meanings and referents for it: 1) essential impossibility: the followers of this theory believe that comparative philosophy suffers from an important defect called “impossibility in essence” because of its internal problems and shortages and should not have been formed at all; 2) appearance of all possibilities and actualization of all potencies and abilities, which emphasizes the principle of progress and perfection; 3) end of the past and a new beginning. Following an analytic-descriptive method and relying on Steven Burik’s viewpoint, the present study investigates and evaluates the theory of the end of comparative philosophy based on these three meanings. Apparently, what opponents of comparative philosophy emphasize is end in the first sense because they believe that this kind of philosophy has become “Europe-centered” and cannot enter any dialog or interaction with other scientific traditions and systems. Accordingly, it conceptually enjoys a kind of essential impossibility. Nevertheless, unlike the opponents, Burik believes that comparative philosophy is necessary for stopping the East’s isolation and the growth of Europe-centeredness. Through adopting a critical approach to the “previous comparative philosophy” because of its Europe-centeredness, he pays attention to the “future comparative philosophy”, which bears two responsibilities: 1) maintaining various methods of thinking and 2) facilitating the relationship between these methods without reducing one to another. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
4 - A Comparative Analysis of the Relationship between Tyche or Chance and Techne in Aristotle and Plutarch
Maryam SamadiehAristotle holds a dual approach to the relationship between techne and tyche (chance). On the one hand, he uses the two terms in the same meaning with the same subject in his Nichomacean Ethics, and in Rhetoric introduces chance as the cause of attaining a limited numbe MoreAristotle holds a dual approach to the relationship between techne and tyche (chance). On the one hand, he uses the two terms in the same meaning with the same subject in his Nichomacean Ethics, and in Rhetoric introduces chance as the cause of attaining a limited number of good things through techne. On the other hand, he connects techne and experience with chance and lack of experience and introduces techne and chance as two opposing concepts. This is because he believes that experience creates techne, and lack of experience exposes Man to chance and accident. A study of Aristotle’s thoughts reveals the reality that techne cannot originate in chance because it demands the knowledge of cause, while chance or luck is an accidental, indeterminate, and unstable cause. Moreover, a study of the relation of techne to aletheia or unconcealedness and disclosure indicates that techne cannot emerge from chance. The reason is that, in Aristotle’s view, techne is a rational virtue that results in revealing the truth, which is itself the result of artists’ knowledge and awareness of the outcome of their craft. Similar to Aristotle, Plutarch accepts chance as a cause; however, he maintains that the existence of techne renders chance meaningless. He believes that techne is rooted in human wisdom and cannot arise from chance. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
5 - Platonic and Aristotelean Roots of the Concept of Time in Islamic Philosophy
Seyed Mohammad Moosavi Baygi Mohammad Amin AfzalzadehTime is one of the most important features of the world of matter, and the knowledge of which has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The simplicity of perception of time and the difficulty of its explanation have resulted in some disagreements among philoso MoreTime is one of the most important features of the world of matter, and the knowledge of which has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The simplicity of perception of time and the difficulty of its explanation have resulted in some disagreements among philosophers concerning its definition. Islamic philosophers are no exception in this regard, and the roots of their disagreements go back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s different definitions of time. Plato defined time as a self-subsistent and essentially independent substance that is a differentiated form of the world of Ideas. In Aristotle’s view, time represents the number of motion from its priority and posteriority aspects, which cannot be gathered with each other. While acknowledging the difference between these two definitions, Islamic philosophers have usually chosen one of these definitions and tried to respond to the suspicions about their selected definition and reject the arguments in favor of the opposing one. Some philosophers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā, and Suhrawardī adopted Aristotle’s definition, while Zakarīyyā Rāzī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī advocated Plato’s definition. Nevertheless, no effort as to demonstrating the contrast between Aristotelean and Platonic definitions of time is justified because both philosophers believe that although time is different from motion, their existences are inseparable from each other. In other words, the perception of one depends on the perception of the other. accordingly, the present paper, while clarifying Plato’s view, initially intends to explain that it is not in contrast to Aristotle’s view and, secondly, aims to demonstrate the effects of their view on those of Muslim philosophers. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
6 - Foucault Against Hegel: A Study of Archaeo-Genealogy and Philosophy of History
Hasan AhmadizadeFoucault and Hegel are two influential thinkers who dealt with the problem of knowledge and history so fundamentally that without understanding the place of history in their thoughts, a correct perception of their views would be extremely difficult. Foucault has scatter MoreFoucault and Hegel are two influential thinkers who dealt with the problem of knowledge and history so fundamentally that without understanding the place of history in their thoughts, a correct perception of their views would be extremely difficult. Foucault has scatteredly referred to Hegel and his opposition to his views in this works; however, he has never clarified the details of this conflict clearly. Nevertheless, a glance at Foucault’s works, particularly those containing his views regarding archaeo-genealogy, reveals a fundamental opposition between his method and Hegel’s approach to the philosophy of history. Foucault’s view, relying on Nietzsche’s ideas, is completely against any kind of metaphysics or philosophy of history, with the former being based on plurality, discontinuity, and non-existence of any kind of universal end and the latter relying on universality, reason, and teleology. Here, the author intends to demonstrate that these two thinkers shared some of their views regarding certain fundamental problems, including those related to history, although they have provided completely different responses to them. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
7 - An Analytic Study of Proclus’ Reading of Aristotle’s Psychology Based on Athulujiya and On the Soul
Hossein Kalbasi Ashtar Hajar Nili AhmadabadiThe knowledge of the soul and its whatness have always held a particular status among philosophical discussions. This, in a way, seems to be the case in empirical sciences as well. Aristotle and Proclus, two representatives of the most prominent and influential ancient MoreThe knowledge of the soul and its whatness have always held a particular status among philosophical discussions. This, in a way, seems to be the case in empirical sciences as well. Aristotle and Proclus, two representatives of the most prominent and influential ancient schools of philosophy – Peripatetic philosophy and Neo-Platonic School, respectively – paid particular attention to this field and discussed them in their main works. Through focusing on two main sources of psychology written by these two philosophers, the present paper is intended to examine the development of the definition of the whatness of the soul while identifying the points of agreement and conflict between the views of Aristotle and Proclus. In his natural definition, Aristotle considers the soul to be related to the body and maintains that it is necessarily the substance and form of the natural body, which enjoys potential life. He also views the soul as the first perfection of the natural body, which enjoys potential life. However, in his metaphysical definition of the soul, he introduces it as being independent of the body and considers the soul to be the origin of the life of the living existent. In his natural and metaphysical definitions of the soul, Proclus follows a relatively similar path to Aristotle. In his natural definition of the soul, he introduces it as the perfection of the body and, in fact, the natural form and perfection of a potentially living organic body. However, he adopts a route different from that of Aristotle in his descriptive definition of the soul. Here, he stipulates that the truth of the soul is a self-made, self-animated, self-formed, and self-actualized entity and believes that the soul is the origin of life and the cause of bodies, their existence and preservation and, in a sense, the creator of their uniqueness and continuity. Manuscript profile