Editor's Note

per Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-1216134articleEditor's NoteHossein Kalbasi Ashtarihkashtari@yahoo.com1Professor, Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran«طبیعت» و «محیط زیست» دو واژه از زمرة واژگانی هستند که در روزگار ما از آنها بسیار نام میبرند و بصورتهای مختلف در گزارشها و خبرها و رویدادهای روزانه، در سراسر جهان انعکاس می&zwnj;یابند. این انعکاس البته بار معنایی متفاوتی با گذشته دارد و اکنون بسبب اشتهای سیری&zwnj;ناپذیر بشر در استخراج ذخایر و منابع و دخالتهای روزافزون و تصرفات گستردۀ آدمی، بتدریج معنای اصیل، نشاط&zwnj;آفرین و الهام&zwnj;بخش خود را از دست داده و در عوض، مکان و صحنه&zwnj;یی سراسر آلوده و بحران&zwnj;زا را به ذهن متبادر میکند. براستی منشأ این دگرگونی و دگردیسی چیست؟ و چرا برخلاف گذشته، نگرانی از تخریب و زوال طبیعت رو به افزایش است؟ قرنهای متمادی، آدمی از محیط پیرامونی خود برای کسب آرامش، تجدید قوا و رفع نیازهای اصلی و اولیه خود بهره میگرفت و مهمتر از همه، «طبیعت» بسان طرح و الگویی اعلی، برای خلاقیتهای هنری و صنعتی لحاظ میشد و بزبان فلسفی، آدمی همواره در کار «تقلید» و «محاکات»، از طبیعت الهام میگرفت و میگیرد. به زبان مابعدالطبیعی و دینی، تمامی مظاهر هستی، کیهان و افلاک، و ازجمله «طبیعت»، نشانه&zwnj;های (آیات) خلقت و آثار صُنع آفریننده است و آدمی با نظر بهمین نشانه&zwnj;ها، میتواند راه خود را در نظر و حتی در عمل، پیدا کند. میدانیم که نقش طبیعت در تمامی دانشها، صنایع و هنرها آشکار است و در صورت فقدان چنین منبع الهام و خلاقیتی، تصور ظهور حتی یک اثر علمی و هنری بدست بشر منتفی است. و نیز میدانیم هر آنچه ساکنان طبیعت از آن طلب کرده&zwnj;اند، بیدریغ و بیمنّت در اختیار آنان قرار داده است. با اینهمه، این ساکنان ـ&zwnj;و درواقع میهمانان&zwnj;ـ ناسپاسِ نسبت به میزبان، نه&zwnj;تنها آداب شکرگذاری از میزبان را بجا نیاوردند، بلکه دست تاراج و یغما را دراز کرده و دارایی خدادادی را در مسیر خلاف فطرت و طبیعت بکار گرفتند. اکنون، اندیشمندان و فیلسوفان هرچه که دربارة «فلسفه محیط زیست» بگویند و بنویسند و بهر میزان که سازمانها و دستگاههای عریض و طویل، درصدد نگاهبانی از میراث رو به زوال منابع طبیعی تلاش کنند، در گوش ناشنوای صاحبان قدرت تکنولوژی اثر نمیکند و چنانکه در کتاب خدا توصیف شده است، بشر بدست خویش، خود را تباه میسازد، مگر آنکه به فطرت سلیم و آموزه&zwnj;های وحی بازگردد و از سرکشی در مقابل قانون الهی منصرف شود. به امید آن روز.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/52490فلسفه محیط زیستper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-12161536articleAn Illuminationist Reading of the Reflection of Zurvanite Thoughts in Pythagorean Wisdom (A Case Study: Pherecydes’s Cosmology)Zahra Zarez.zare.62@gmail.com1Assistant Professor, Anthropology Research Institute, Cultural Heritage and Tourism Research Institute, Tehran, IranThe present study aims to elucidate the position of Pherecydes of Syros – as one of the influential teachers of Pythagoras – in the pre-Socratic philosophical tradition, by deeply examining the essential connections between his thoughts and Zurvanite teachings. Following a descriptive-analytical method and relying on extensive library studies, along with documented comparative analyses and references to credible historical evidence, this paper meticulously compares the fundamental components of Pherecydes’ philosophy, including his divine cosmology centered on the role of Chronos (Time), the concept of Heptamychos as a cosmic structure, and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, with the principles of Zurvanite monotheism, especially in light of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist reading of wisdom. The research findings indicate that Pherecydes, as the first pre-Socratic philosopher to formulate a coherent cosmological system, was profoundly influenced by Eastern philosophical trends, particularly Zurvanite beliefs. This deep influence was transmitted through him to Pythagorean wisdom and played a role in shaping the intellectual foundations of later Greek philosophical schools. This paper, by criticizing and correcting some previous erroneous views in this field and by direct reference to historical documents, as well as a detailed content analysis of Pherecydes' remaining ideas, introduces him as a key and largely overlooked intermediary link in the transmission of fundamental concepts from Zurvanite monotheism to Pythagorean wisdom. Through the discovery of this ancient connection, the author tries to contribute to enriching the literature in the field of Suhrawardī studies and to further clarify the close and historical relationship between the Khosravani wisdom of ancient Iran and Pythagorean wisdom.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/51621Pythagorean Wisdom Illuminationist Philosophy Zurvanism Pherecydes of Syros Heptamychosper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-121613762articleThe Word “Sīyāsat” in Arabic Dictionaries Before the Fifth Century AH: A Historical InquirySajjad Hejrisajjadhejri@gmail.com1Hojjat Fallah Tootkarh.fallah1347@gmail.com2Bagher Ali Adelfarb.adelfar@hum.ikiu.ac.ir3Abddorrafi' Rahimirahimi@hum.ikiu.ac.ir4PhD candidate of Post-Islam History of Iran, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranAssociate Professor, Department of History, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranAssociate Professor, Department of History, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranAssociate Professor, Department of History, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranThe frequently used word “Sīyāsat,” which today corresponds to “politics” and “policy,” has a long history in the Islamic world, especially in practical wisdom. Some historians consider the historical meaning of this word to be different from its current meaning, while others consider them somewhat similar. To judge between these two viewpoints, one should first examine it in Arabic dictionaries, among which the dictionaries written up to the 5th century are of significant importance and exhibit originality. This article attempts to analyze the philology of the word “Sīyāsat” and to explore the components of its semantic network. For this purpose, dictionaries written up to the 5th century AH have been individually examined and compared. Although the majority of these works are silent about the connection of “Sīyāsat” with the nominal meanings of "س و س", two dictionaries, Maqayis al-Lughah by Ibn Fāris and Al-Furūq al-Lughawīyyah by Abū Ḥilāl al-Askarī, have put forward certain hypotheses in this regard that make it difficult to judge between them and choose one. Abū Ḥilāl is the only lexicographer among these dictionary writers who compared “Sīyāsat” (politics or policy) with “tadbīr” (administration, governance). In this comparison, Abū Ḥilāl believes that the actions and attributes of “Sīyāsat” cannot be applied to God. However, the phrase “Sīyāsat Allāh” (God’s governance) has been used in the texts written by his contemporaries, and it seems that Miskawayh al-Rāzī, in Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, was a pioneer in using this compound, apparently under the influence of its Greek translations. This article aims to investigate Abū Ḥilāl’s claim regarding “Sīyāsat”.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/51839Sīyāsat Sīyāsat Allah Tadbīr al-‘ain Maqayis al-Lughah Abū Ḥilāl al-Askari Miskawayh al-Rāzīper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-121616384articleSecondary Intelligibles, Time and Space from the Perspectives of Kant and Mullā Ṣadrā: A Comparative Study Hossein Aliramezanimoshahede@gmail.com1Mahdi Monfaredmmonfared86@gmail.com2PhD Candidate of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, University of Qom, Qom, IranAssociate Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam Department, University of Qom, Qom, IranThe present study aims to compare the views of Mullā Ṣadrā and Kant on time and space to identify the potential intellectual affinities between these two thinkers in understanding these two concepts. The comparison is made when the analytical foundations of the two philosophers differ considerably, while their goals and sometimes their methods are the same. Mullā Ṣadrā and Kant fundamentally differ in their epistemological analysis of time and space and, for this reason, their methods do not align with each other, making a comparison between their views difficult. However, instances of proximity between the two philosophers can be found within their discourse; both have considered knowledge itself to be needless of proof, and “essential priority” (in the terminology of Islamic philosophy) in knowledge is close to Kant's concepts of “a priori” and “transcendental,” which can be inferred from the tenor of his explanation of transcendence. It seems that Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of secondary intelligibles can be aligned with Kant's prior (and not necessarily transcendental) knowledge, and observe that both their interpretations return to a similar point. What Kant considers to be the function of pure reason (in the Sadrian language, abstracted from sense) can be considered the same as the “perception of non-sensory meaning” in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, and beyond the thoughts of both philosophers, the two viewpoints are found to be closely similar. “The distance of knowledge from the first sensory perception in terms of time and space” is seen in the words of both Kant and Mullā Ṣadrā.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/50156Secondary Intelligible Time Space Mulla Sadra Kantper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-1216185100articleA Study of Two False Perspectives on Khwajah Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī: A Hellenist Scholar from Azerbaijan Morteza MotavalliMotavalimorteza@ut.ac.ir1PhD in Philosophy and Islamic Theology, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranIn non-Persian and non-Arabic works about Khwajah Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, two strange views have emerged: that Ṭūsī was a scholar from Azerbaijan, and that he was committed to a Hellenistic perspective. This paper is intended to examine these two views and reveal their historical and analytical errors. During the last hundred years, neighboring countries have tried to claim Iran’s scholars as their own. One of these attempts is to consider Khwajah Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī as Azerbaijani. Based on a historical and analytical approach, this paper initially shows that in no way can Ṭūsī be considered a scientist from Azerbaijan, and then it explains the reasons for this academic theft, including the fact that by doing so, they legitimize their government and strengthen its cultural pillars. On the other hand, given Ṭūsī’s extensive activities in mathematics and astronomy, Jamil Rajab, a historian of science in the Islamic tradition, intends to demonstrate that he sought to preserve the Greek heritage. Here, the author aims to prove that the claim that Ṭūsī was committed to a Hellenistic perspective, without pursuing the practical needs of the Islamic society or religious or other objectives, cannot be considered a sound allegation. Such a reductionist view of Ṭūsī conceals his complex and multidimensional personality.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/51864Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Azerbaijan Islamic Iran Hellenism theft of scholars reductive viewper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-12161101124articleFrom the Responsibility of Philosophy to Religious Education (A Case Study: Plato, Hirst, and Mullā Ṣadrā)Maryam Soltani Kouhanestanim.soltani.philosophy@gmail.com1Parastoo MesbahiP.mesbahij@yahoo.com2Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Mohaghegh Ardabili, Ardabil, IranAssistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Farhangian University, Tehran, IranThe present study, focusing on the responsibility of philosophy, examines its relationship with religious education from the perspective of Plato, Hirst, and Mullā Ṣadrā. The research findings reveal that divine philosophers, unlike secular philosophers, consider education as related to knowledge and its ultimate goal as the flourishing of innate nature, resemblance to the divine origin, wise training, and at the highest level, training as a vicegerent of God. From this perspective, philosophy is responsible for guiding human reason, will, and human motives on a divine path. Accordingly, among divine philosophers, there is a positive relationship between the responsibility of philosophy and religious education. However, from the perspective of some theorists in the field of education, such as Hirst, who belong to the analytical tradition, this relationship is denied and, therefore, the ultimate goal of education is at best introduced as the education of a social human being. In the view of divine philosophers, religious education is the objective manifestation of the responsibility of philosophy. It is not a posterior matter subordinate to the responsibility of philosophy; rather, it is an a priori and fundamental horizon whose realization is identical with the realization of the responsibility of philosophy. In such a reading, speaking of the relationship between these two is not of the type of subject-predicate or basis-result relations, but rather of the type of the existential individuation of the responsibility of philosophy in religious education. This originates in the different anthropological, epistemological, and ontological foundations of these three philosophers.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/50677responsibility of philosophy religious education Mullā Ṣadrā Plato Hirstper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-12161125144articleAn Analysis of Khwajah Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s View on Existence- Quiddity Relation: Principiality of Existence or Principiality of Existent?Zhaleh Moradimoradi.j683@gmail.com1Somayeh Monfaredso.monfared@ilam.ac.ir2Shamsollah Serajsh.seraj@ilam.ac.ir3PhD Candidate of Islamic Philosophy and Kalm, Ilam University, Ilam, IranAssistant Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam Department, Ilam University, Ilam, IranAssociate Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam Department, Ilam University, Ilam, IranThe issue of the principiality of existence or quiddity is one of the fundamental and influential discussions in Islamic philosophy, whose roots can be traced back to philosophical dialogs before Mullā Ṣadrā. In his works, especially in the book Tajrīd al-i‘tiqād, Khwajah Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, a prominent philosopher and mutikallim of the 7th century AH, addressed the issue of existence and quiddity in various ways, presenting a complex and partially synthetic view of the opinions of the Peripatetics and Illuminationists on this issue. Ṭūsī’s view serves as the connecting link between Peripatetic philosophy and Transcendent Philosophy; therefore, understanding his view helps in understanding the philosophical developments from Ibn Sīnā to Mullā Ṣadrā. The present study first identifies the point of conflict in the issue of the principiality and mentally-positedness, following a new approach, and accordingly examines Ṭūsī’s view on two levels: ontology and epistemology. Although some of Ṭūsī’s statements make it difficult to determine his exact position on the principiality of existence or quiddity, evidence suggests that, in all his works, he adhered to the objective oneness of existence and quiddity in the outside and their distinction in the mind. In various contexts, including the addition of existence to quiddity, and creation and gradation, Ṭūsī considers the existent as principial, not existence nor quiddity without existence. However, the presentation of this issue in different works has taken on a different appearance depending on the audience and the purpose of writing.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/50168Existence quiddity Principiality Khwajah Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī Creation gradationper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-12161145168articleThe Problem of Human Identity: From Cartesian Secular Individual Identity to Aṭṭār’s Divine Collective Identity Mohammad Ali Abbasian Chaleshtoriabbasian@pnu.ac.ir1Professor at the Islamic Philosophy and Kalam Department, Payame-Noor University, Tehran, IranThe questions of whether humans have an identity and, if the answer is yes, whether this identity is individual or collective, divine or non-divine, lie at the core of what is called the “problem of identity.” Since Descartes’ time, these questions have turned into the main focus of philosophical reflections on human identity. In response to these questions, Descartes and his modern followers have acknowledged an individual and non-divine identity for humans; Levinas has entirely denied identity, and a group of phenomenologists have come to believe in a kind of “non-divine collective pseudo-identity.” The Cartesian view of identity is intertwined with the concept of “epistemic sameness,” while the phenomenological view emphasizes the concept of “intersubjectivity.” Critics of Descartes argue that his theory of individual identity leads to “solipsism,” meaning that “I am alone in the world”, and that “I am the only one who can know any external world exists.” However, centuries before Descartes, postmodernists, and phenomenologists, using a symbolic language and an integrative approach, Aṭṭār Nishābūrī presented a distinct theory of human identity in his Manṭiq al-ṭayr (The Conference of the Birds); a theory that contains elements of phenomenology and Cartesian theory and reinterprets the concepts of “intersubjectivity” and “epistemic sameness” in a gnostic and theological context. This paper introduces and explains this theory, titled the “theory of divine collective human identity”; a theory that can open new horizons for understanding human beings and their identity.http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/51391problem of identity epistemic sameness intersubjectivity Descartes Levinas Phenomenology Aṭṭār