per Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-0215234articleEditor's NoteHossein Kalbasi Ashtarihkashtari@yahoo.com1<p>امروزه آگاهی محصلان و پژوهشگران فلسفه دربارۀ تقسیمبندی مکاتب فلسفی غرب به «قاره‌یی» و «تحلیلی»، و شیوه‌های تحقیق مختص به هر یک، به‌اندازه‌یی است که در مواجهه با هر پدیده و پرسش جدید، بیدرنگ همین دو رهیافت، خود را بر هر پاسخ ممکن تحمیل میکند و گویا راه سومی در فهم و تبیین پدیده‌ها و موضوعات فلسفی معاصر وجود ندارد. تردیدی نیست که این تقسیمبندی حاصل چالشهایی است که آدمی، بویژه از اوایل قرن گذشتة میلادی، در عرصه‌های مختلف اجتماعی، سیاسی و فرهنگی با آن دست‌وپنجه نرم کرده و اکنون نیز با صورتهایی پیچیده‌تر از گذشته، با آنها مواجه است. بیراه نیست که تقسیمبندی مشربهای فلسفی به «جدید» و «معاصر» نیز با همین پیشینه قابل توجیه باشد. اما اکنون، با گذشت بیش از یک قرن از تجربۀ فلسفۀ معاصر، آیا لازم است در نتایج و پیامدهای دو رهیافت یاد شده، تأملی صورت گیرد و بپرسیم در موقعیت کنونی و شرایط عالم معاصر، و در حلّ و حتی تبیین چالشهای فراگیر امروز، چه درس و آموزه‌یی را میتوان از آنها فراگرفت و چه مددی را خواهند رساند؟ البته که فلسفه چیزی جز دعوت به تفکر نیست و ازاینرو، کسی از این دانش، حل و دفع و رفع مشکلات و بحرانهای رو به تزاید آدمی را انتظار ندارد، ولی قدر مسلم، فهم بنیادها و مبادی موقعیتهای بشری بر عهدۀ فلسفه است و حتی گزاف نیست که گفته شود حضور واقعی فلسفه از بروز بسیاری از بحرانها جلوگیری میکند. امروز و در جهان معاصر، خشونت و جنگ و نابرابری، بپشتوانۀ تکنیک و سلاحهای رنگارنگ، تا حدّ قتل‌عام و نسل‌کشی و محو کامل یک ملت پیش رفته است و برای نمونه، همگان شاهد پاک شدن ملتی مظلوم و بیدفاع بنام «غزه» از نقشۀ جغرافیایی جهان، بدست جمعیتی قلیل اما متجاوز و آدمکش، هستند و هیچ نیروی بازدارنده‌یی جز مقاومت همین ملت، نیست که به این جنایت و تجاوز آشکار، پایان دهد. باید پرسید در چنین موقعیتی چه کاری از دست نظریه و نظریه‌پردازان علوم انسانی ساخته است؟ چه آینده‌یی پیش روی بشر و نهادها و سازمانهای عریض و طویل حقوقی که برای حمایت از همین بشر پدید آمده‌اند، قرار دارد؟ اکنون بنظر میرسد بجای نزاع بر سر رهیافتهایی مانند تحلیلی و قاره‌یی، باید به سرآغازها و سرچشمه‌ها بازگردیم و ببینیم چرا اندوختۀ دانشی بشر نتوانسته است برای صلح و آرامش، و برابری و امنیت او کاری انجام دهد؟ آیا در محاسبات و تحلیلهای خود، چیزی را از قلم انداخته و باید در مفروضات و انگاشته‌های خود تجدید نظر کند؟ شاید چندان دور نباشد که آگاهی و هشیاری نسبت به این امر و ضرورت بازخوانی مفروضات انسان‌شناسانه، برغم حجم عظیم آن، واقع شود و از پس آن، صورتی متفاوت با هیئت معرفتی متداول، ظاهر گردد.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/49402فلسفه جدید فلسفه معاصر فلسفه تحلیلی فلسفه قارهایper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-02152524articleUnity of Corporeal Substance: The Study of an Aristotelean ChallengeFaezeh Hajihosseinifz.hajihosseini@ut.ac.ir1Mustafa Zalim.zali@ut.ac.ir2MA in Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranAssistant Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran<p>This paper focuses on a challenge rooted in Aristotle’s writings on the truth of corporeal substance. On the one hand, body as substance is always concomitant with a kind of ontological priority. Therefore, the unity of corporeal substance is prior to the unity of matter and form. On the other hand, Aristotle’s perception of the truth of change necessitates that matter, as one of the components of body, remains fixed in the process of change in order to preserve the unity of change. Thus, corporeal substance consists of matter and form, is posterior to them, and depends on them. The response to this problem, which is called the “paradox of unity”, is formulated in two traditional and new molds of interpretation. The present study initially reviews the main elements of these two interpretations and then, through distinguishing between the two types of unity, namely vertical and horizontal, demonstrates that the traditional interpretation is incapable of explaining the vertical unity of matter and form. It also stipulates that the new interpretation is insufficient for clarifying horizontal unity. Finally, the authors provide a unitary interpretation of the synthesis of matter and form, as a third response to this question, which explains both horizontal and vertical forms of unity free from previous problems.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/47877corporeal substance unity matter form paradox of unity unitary synthesis of matter and formper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-021522544articleHistorical Background of the Theory of Corporeal Resurrection in Mīr Dāmād’s PhilosophyHadi Mousavihmousavi@rihu.ac.ir1Assistance Professor, Department of Philosophy of Humanities, Research Institute of Hawzeh and University, Qom, Iran<p>All divine religions and several realist philosophical systems attach great importance to explaining resurrection as a truth. The historical study of this point from different aspects in Islamic philosophy can result in the emergence of a number of new wonders for researchers in the field of philosophy. Based on the general view, the theory of corporeal resurrection in philosophy began with Mullā Ṣadrā. However, according to the proofs presented in this paper, Mīr Dāmād is one of the thinkers who not only discussed spiritual resurrection but also spoke of the quality of corporeal resurrection. This indicates that the theory of corporeal resurrection based on philosophical principles dates back to the time before Mullā Ṣadrā particularly because the corporeal resurrection that Mīr Dāmād believes in is not actualized with purgatorial or Ideal body but with the human natural body. In another place, he calls this kind of resurrection “revivification of bodies”. Nevertheless, what is important here is the philosophical elements that Mīr Dāmād employs to explain this kind of resurrection in his own philosophical system, including his division of different bodily modes and the quality of the soul’s unity with each of these modes. He also states that at the time of death, a part of this unity is broken but the body’s relation with the soul is not completely severed. This is the criterion for the return of the soul to the body and corporeal resurrection.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/48435corporeal resurrection natural corporeal resurrection Mīr Dāmād Identity of body principiality of quiddityper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-021524570articleA Comparative Study of the Genealogy of the Meaning of Motion in the Transcendent Philosophy and Theoretical GnosisRasool Padashpoorrasool70.p@gmail.com1Ramin Golmakanir-golmakani@yahoo.com2Zahra HijiniaZ69hajinia@gmail.com3PhD inIslamic Philosophy , ..., Mashhad, IranAssistant Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences, Mashhad, IranPhD candidate, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran<p>The development of a comprehensive definition of motion has always occupied the minds of thinkers. This issue was also of concern to Greek thinkers before Muslim philosophers, and each of them provided their own definition for motion. Mullā Ṣadrā, in addition to the common meaning of this term (gradual change), provided a general definition for it (absolute exit from potency to act) that is compatible with both potency and act. Motion should be considered one of the accidents of existence exactly in the same way that potency and act are viewed as modes of being and essential accidents of existence and are placed among the problems of prime philosophy. Therefore, if, according to Hakim Sabziwari, motion in general is defined as exiting “non-existence” to enter “existence” and going from “possibility” to “necessity”, such a general meaning of motion can be attributed to immaterial things in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view as well. In the same way, gnostics also believe in a motion that begins from a divine stroke and embraces the whole levels of being. They called this the “passionate movement”, which means the cause of creation and appearance of things in the world. It is the same divine love and kindness that flows in all things and contains everything in the arches of descent and ascent. Hence, following a descriptive-analytic method, in this paper the authors intend to demonstrate that, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, the system of being and, in gonstics’ view, individuations and behavioral manifestations are always in motion towards an ultimate end. Mullā Ṣadrā called this motion the trans-substantial motion, which flows in the essence of things, and gnostics call it the passionate motion.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/46077Potency act Motion passionate movementper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-021527192articleMetamorphosis of the Word “Concomitance” in Islamic Philosophy and KalāmHossein khorsandiaminh.khorsandiamin@gmail.com1PhD candidate of Transcendent Philosophy, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Level 4 Seminary student and lecturer at Khorasan Seminary, Mashhad, Iran<p>Presently, the term “concomitance” in Islamic philosophy means equality in referents alongside unity in truth. Whenever, two words include all their referents and apply to all of them from a single aspect, they are concomitants. The historical-analytic study of “concomitance” in Islamic philosophy and <em>kalām</em> indicates that this term was used in a different meaning before ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī and even his own words. According to the meaning given above, “concomitance’ is used in a general sense including equality in both referent and concept. The author believes that the assumption of unity in the direction of truth as one of the semantic bases of this term has only been propounded by some of the students of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Hence, it cannot be used in its present meaning in the words of early <em>mutīkallīmūn</em> and philosophers. The present paper, examines the meaning of “concomitance” in two different periods: before and after ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. The author initially investigates the lexical meaning of “concomitance” and its functions and applications in the words of <em>mutīkallīmūn</em> and philosophers and demonstrates that its common meaning of their time was different from what is common today. Then, after a meticulous study of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s words, he proves that this great philosopher also used this term in the same sense that his predecessors did. Finally, he explores and criticizes the arguments of the advocates of the new interpretation of “concomitance” and challenges their ideas. To support his argument by an example, the author provides a historical analysis of the “concomitance of existence and unity” in Islamic <em>kalām</em> and philosophy.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/48185concomitance equality unity in direction of truth concomitance of existence and unityper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-0215293116articleA Study of the Development of the Term “Philosophy” in the Islamic WorldFardin Jamshidi Mehrfjamshidi@gonbad.ac.ir1Aref DanyaliAref_danyali@gonbad.ac.ir2Assistant Professor, Theology (Philosophy) Department, Faculty of Humanities and Physical Education, Gonbad Kavous University, Gonbad Kavous, IranAssistant Professor, Theology (Philosophy) Department, Faculty of Humanities and Physical Education, Gonbad Kavous University, Gonbad Kavous, Iran<p>Philosophy is a demonstrative science in order to know the truths of being qua being. Such a knowledge makes no reference to any holy and divine affair in its title. However, in the world of Islam, philosophy gradually was accompanied with certain religious and theological terms, the most prominent of which is “Islamic”. In recent decades, the term “Islamic philosophy” has been discussed by certain thinkers and each of them has presented some views in order to justify it. It seems that, in order to examine the truth of Islamic philosophy more accurately, it is first necessary to study its historical roots. When it was the time to translate Greek philosophy books during the Translation movement, the term “philosophy” became prevalent in the world of Islam with no prefix. Kindī was the first Muslim philosopher who only used the term “prime” before philosophy. Of course, he considered a role for philosophy similar to that of religion, which could direct man to the peak of divine perfections. However, he never used any term other than “philosophy” and “prime philosophy”. Fārābī, who showed his own innovations in several fields, was the first philosopher and one of the rare Muslim philosophers who described philosophy laden with ethical and religious semantic adjectives. He even divided philosophy into different layers, with some of them being abject and some of them noble, or described some as being defective and some as perfect. Accordingly, it can be said that Fārābī played a significant role in granting a religious nature to philosophy, after him, Muslim philosophers used many different attributes for philosophy. Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī used the term “supreme philosophy”; Ikhwān al-Ṣafā used the term “spiritual philosophy”, and even Ibn Sīnā in some places used the term “divine philosophy”, as well as “polite philosophy”, “impolite philosophy”, and “Oriental philosophy”. Ghazzālī, whose opposition to philosophy is quite known to all, referred to “philosophy of divine people”. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Ibn Ṭabīb, and Shahrzūrī used the terms “supreme philosophy”, “best philosophy”, and “philosophy of truth”, respectively. Suhrawardī used the term “Illuminationist philosophy”, which referred to his philosophical method. Interestingly enough, none of these terms enjoyed an ethical, religious, and holy semantic load, and each referred to one aspect of the multiple aspects of the philosophy intended by different philosophers. However, unlike most Muslim philosophers who equated philosophy with wisdom, Mīr Dāmād, the Peripatetic philosopher of the Ṣafavīd era, granted philosophy a status lower than that of wisdom. In his view, philosophy was the same legacy of the Greeks, which had been developed and promoted to the level of wisdom in the light of Islamic teachings. He believed that philosophy can never reach the level of wisdom unless in the light of Islam and its supreme teachings. He was the first thinker who used the term “Islamic philosophy” for first time for a kind of wisdom that he considered to be nobler and more perfect than Greek philosophy. Mīr Dāmād viewed himself at the same level with Ibn Sīnā as the leader of Islamic philosophy and with Fārābī in teaching it. The term “Islamic philosophy” remained forsaken after Mīr Dāmād until the contemporary period. In the present period, even a philosopher such as ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’ did not use it and, instead, employed the term “philosophy of Islam” or the “divine philosophy of Islam”, which could be semantically different from “Islamic philosophy”. Abdulraḥmān Badvī and Murtaḍā Muṭahharī began disseminating the term “Islamic philosophy” almost at the same time, that is in 1330’s (1950’s). The results of the present study reveal that what contemporary thinkers state in order to justify this title is completely different from Mīr Dāmād’s conception of Islamic philosophy. The required data for this study were collected based on documentary research and analyzed following a historical-descriptive-logical method. </p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/48397Philosophy prime philosophy Islamic wisdom Islamic philosophy Mīr Dāmādper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-02152117136articleMīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī’s Life and his Role and Place in Tehran School of PhilosophyAbbasali Mansouria.mansouri@razi.ac.ir1Associate Professor, Theology Department, Razi University, Kermanshah, Iran<p>Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī was one of the great figures of Tehran School of Philosophy and one of the main pillars of the transfer of philosophy to later generations. His involvement in philosophy and gnosis was to the extent that he can be considered a philosopher. He studied in the school of Mīrzā Abulḥassan Jelwah and benefitted from the classes of Āqā ‘Alī Modarres Zunuzi until he became an authority in rational sciences. This is supported by the fact that some of the high-level scholars of Najaf, many of whom were well-known jurisprudents, participated in his <em>al-Asfār</em> classes. As acknowledged by some prominent figures such as Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtīyānī, Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī was a master of gnostic debates and manifested great accuracy in discussing various problems in theoretical gnosis. The present paper consists of two parts. The first deals with the biography of Mīrzā Aḥmad, his birth and family, scientific status, masters, students, works, and moral characteristics, and the second part details the similarities and differences between his views and those of most of the philosophers of the Tehran School of Philosophy.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/47389Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī Tehran School of Philosophy contemporary philosophers philosophy in Iran Segregation School Tehran’s Philosophersper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteتاریخ فلسفه2008-95892676-51602025-02152137168articleA Study of the Views of Fārābī and Descartes on Beauty in Music with an Emphasis on Consonance and Dissonance in Intervals Between NotesMohammad Saleh Baratalims.baratali@semnan.ac.ir1Farideh Afarinafarin.farideh@gmail.com2MA student, Department of Art Studies, Faculty of Art, Semnan University, Semnan, IranAssociate Professor, Department of Art Studies, Faculty of Art, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran<p>This study investigates the views of Fārābī and Descartes regarding beauty in music and the quality of emphasizing the consonance and dissonance of intervals between notes and their perception by listeners. In order to compare their views around beauty in music, the authors have adopted a descriptive-analytic method. The findings of the study indicate that both of them, while commonly focusing on Greek philosophy as the foundation of their philosophical and mathematical endeavors, believe that the harmony between sounds and Man’s natural feelings underlies the sense of beauty in music. However, they have defined the criterion for this principle differently. The main difference between them is that Fārābī, in addition to his formalist approach to beauty in music, also pays attention to its perception by listeners. In fact, he follows a social approach to music. He maintains that the perception of beauty helps Man and civil society to attain happiness. Nevertheless, Descartes follows an individualistic approach and believes that the ultimate end of listening to music is utter joy. His reliance on mathematics led him to propose the consonance of the third and sixth intervals for the first time after confirming the dissonance of the fourth interval in contiguity, which Fārābī also agreed with. On the other hand, Descartes’ mathematical view prevented him from making any suggestion regarding the introduction of the consonance of arrangements so that composers and musicians would appreciate it. Unlike him, Fārābī, based on his own practical experience in the field of music, introduced some arrangement of notes that enjoy more melodic features.</p>http://hop.mullasadra.org/Article/47056Fārābī Descartes Consonance dissonance musical intervals beauty