He is the Wise, the Omniscient

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A Comparative Study of the Ideas and their Relation to the Sensible World in Plato and Mīr Dāmād

Asghar Arshia,[1] Mahdi Monfared[2] and Mohsen Eizadi[3]

Undoubtedly, one of the most influential philosophical issues throughout the history of philosophy is the Plato's theory of Ideas. Here, the problem of the relationship between the world of Ideas and the sensible world constitutes one of the most fundamental challenges in Plato's philosophy and in Islamic interpretations of it. By proposing the theory of Ideas, Plato sought to provide an account of the stability of reality versus the instability of the material world. However, in explaining the nature of the relationship between the eternal world of Ideas and the changing sensible world, he encountered certain conceptual and ontological difficulties. Mīr Dāmād, a prominent philosopher of the School of Isfahan, took a new step toward resolving this problem through revisiting Neoplatonic philosophy and drawing upon the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy. By proposing the theory of *dahr* (Aeon)as an intermediate level between *sarmad* (the divine realm)

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and time (the material realm) and by offering a new interpretation of the theory of Ideas, he provided the basis for explaining the quality of the emanation of existence from divine knowledge into the material world and tried to resolve the problem of the origin and appearance of the Ideas. Furthermore, drawing upon the philosophy of prophethood and *Imāmate* within the theory of the Perfect Man, he regarded human existence as the link connecting the three realms and thus succeeded in resolving the problem of the relationship between the world of Ideas and the sensible world. This study demonstrates that, by combining philosophical reason with gnostic intuition, Mīr Dāmād offered a more coherent account of the relationship between the Ideas and sensible things and thereby expanded and revised the Platonic system within the horizon of Islamic philosophy.

Key Terms

the Ideas
time
Mīr Dāmād
dahr (Aeon)
Plato

A Critical Analysis of the View of Ḥakīm ʻAlī Qulī Ibn Qarachghāy Khān Concerning Eschatology and Bodily Resurrection

Hamidreza Khademi[*]

In his *Iḥyā' al-Ḥikmah*, in the course of discussing eschatology, ʻAlī Qulī Ibn Qarachghāy Khān identifies three meanings of bodily resurrection. In the third meaning, he refers to a type of body that he calls the "returning sensible elemental body". He maintains that this body differs from both the worldly material body and the Ideal body and is created and generated for the human being in the abode of resurrection. To demonstrate the necessity of the existence of such a body, he bases his argument on the issue of retribution and sensible retaliation. In other words, if an oppressed person has suffered physical pain and distress in this world, the realization of divine justice requires that the possibility of exacting this right and obtaining sensible retribution be provided in the Hereafter. In his view, this would be impossible without the existence of a returning sensible elemental body. To strengthen this position, he also cites certain verses of the Noble Qur'ān and

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examines the resurrection of animals and human beings from the perspectives of divine justice and power. Employing a descriptive method, the present study elucidates ‘Alī Qulī Khān’s view and the foundations of his argument and evaluates his premises and evidence through an analytical-comparative method. The findings indicate that the verses he cites do not explicitly establish the existence of a returning sensible elemental body and are primarily concerned with the possibility and realization of resurrection as such. Furthermore, the distinction he draws between the returning sensible elemental body and the Ideal body is not clearly explained or adequately substantiated. In addition, on the basis of the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy concerning bodily identity, the relationship between the soul and the body, and the persistence of personal identity, the realization of retributive justice and the vindication of the rights of the oppressed can be explained within the framework of the Ideal body. Accordingly, the necessity of establishing the existence of a returning sensible elemental body does not follow from ‘Alī Qulī Khān’s argument.

Key Terms

Ideal body
bodily resurrection
the Judgement Day
‘Alī Qulī Khān Qarachghāy
resurrection
retribution

From the Longing of the Creature to the Horizon of Finitude: A Comparative Study of Augustinian "Restlessness" and "Anxiety" in Kierkegaard and Heidegger

Mohammad Tamirkari[*]

This study undertakes a comparative examination of the concept of "anxiety" in the thought of Augustine, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger. Its central question is whether the similarities between Augustinian restlessness, Kierkegaardian anxiety, and Heideggerian anxiety are merely verbal or whether they indicate a "structural homology." Employing the method of comparative phenomenology, the study demonstrates that, for all three thinkers, anxiety is a fundamental and "disclosive" state that detaches human beings from immersion in everydayness and confronts them with the truth of finitude and the possibility of being themselves. The paper conducts this comparison on three levels: the ontological level (the origin of anxiety), the functional level (its disclosive nature), and the teleological level (the response to anxiety). The findings indicate that, although these three philosophers are ultimately influenced by distinct intellectual traditions in their respective

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explanations (classical theology, religious existentialism, and secular ontology), the phenomenological structure of their experiences exhibits a striking continuity. The transition from "longing for rest in God" in Augustine, to the "vertigo of freedom" in Kierkegaard, and finally to "authenticity in the face of nothingness" in Heidegger, traces the genealogy of the transformation of this concept from theology to ontology. The conclusion is that, within this tradition, anxiety is not a pathological condition but rather a "guide to authenticity" and a necessity for awakening from existential oblivion, placing Dasein within the horizon of the question of the meaning of Being.

Key Terms

anxiety
Kierkegaard
restlessness
secularization
Augustine
Heidegger
freedom
authenticity

The Status of "Existent" in the Opposition between Homonymy and Univocity: A Comparison of the Views of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Ibn Sīnā

Vahid Khademzadeh[*]

According to the Aristotelian classification, words fall into one of two categories: homonymous or univocal. However, the status of "existent" within this classification is not entirely clear. In Aristotelian thought, the univocity of 'existent' would imply that being constitutes a genus encompassing its instances. On the other hand, if "existent" is homonymous, "existent qua existent" cannot be regarded as the subject matter of metaphysics. Aristotelian commentators have tried to offer some solutions to this problem. The present study aims to explain and compare how Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Ibn Sīnā addressed this issue. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry explicitly reject the view that "existent" has a single meaning and is therefore univocal. Alexander distinguishes three categories of words, placing 'existent' in the third category, which lies between homonymy and univocity. Nevertheless, in line with Aristotle, Porphyry upholds the binary division of words into homonymous and univocal and explicitly

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regards “existent” as homonymous. Ibn Sīnā, in turn, clearly acknowledges that “existent,” as an equivocal term, has a single meaning. However, because the meaning of “existent” is not considered one in every respect, he places it between homonymy and univocity.

Key Terms

homonymy
existent
Ibn Sīnā
univocity
Aristotle

From Dialectical Necessity to the History of Being: Rereading the Transformation of the Concept of Necessity in Hegel and Heidegger

Ali Fathi[*]

The problem of "necessity" is one of the fundamental concepts in the history of modern philosophy, having developed in relation to reason, history, and the possibility of the emergence of meaning. This problem has assumed different yet interconnected forms in the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger, notwithstanding the fundamental differences in their philosophical approaches. Employing an analytical-comparative method and drawing upon the primary works of Hegel and Heidegger, the present study examines the transformation in the status of the concept of necessity from its grounding in the dialectic of the concept in Hegel's philosophy to its reconfiguration within the history of Being in Heidegger's thought. For Hegel, necessity is understood in connection with the concept's internal movement, determinate negation, mediation, and the immanent rationality of history. Heidegger, by contrast, through his critique of the metaphysics of presence, shifts the problem from the level of conceptual necessity

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to the question of the conditions of possibility for the appearance of meaning, history, and understanding within the horizon of the unconcealment of Being. The main finding of this study indicates that the transition from Hegel to Heidegger can be understood neither as a rejection of necessity nor as the transfer of a single concept from one philosophical system to another. Rather, it should be understood as a transformation in the horizon of understanding within which the problem of necessity itself becomes articulable. In this context, the author employs the concept of "event-based necessity" to explain the relationship between the unconcealment of Being, possibility, and the transformation of the problem of necessity in this philosophical transition.

Key Terms

necessity
Heidegger
history of being
unconcealment of being
Hegel
dialectic
event
metaphysics of presence

A Critique of the Meanings of the Emanation of the Order of Being from God According to Mīr Dāmād: With an Emphasis on its Historical Dimension

Mahmud Saidy[*]

The foundations of the arguments for the Principle of the One (nothing proceeds from the one but one) are based on the fact that the Necessary Being is one in reality, and the cause is commensurate with its effect. This issue has given rise to numerous controversies throughout the history of Islamic philosophy. In Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's view, commensurability means that there is a particular mode in the essence of the Necessary Being in relation to the emanation of the First Intellect; that very mode would necessarily entail another commensurability and another mode, leading to an infinite regress. By distinguishing between the meaning of emanation and the origin of its emanation, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī sought to respond to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's objections. According to Mīr Dāmād, the emanation of the Necessary Being has three meanings: an additional and relational concept, the mode from

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which the First Intellect emanates, and the emanation of the entire order of Being. Based on his arguments, the mode from which the First Intellect emanates is neither identical with the essence of the Necessary Being; rather it is additional to His essence. However, given that the totality of the world does not possess a unity distinct from its constituent parts and levels, its emanation likewise does not require a distinct and different mode in the essence of the Necessary Being. Moreover, the effusion of the First Intellect is tantamount to the emanation of all existents, since the First Emanated Being is the cause of all subsequent levels of existence and possesses all their perfections. Hence, distinguishing between the mode from which the First Intellect emanates and the emanation of all existents and the entire order of the good is not justified.

Key Terms

emanation
principle of the One
Mīr Dāmād
First Intellect
Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī