%0 Journal Article %T Aristotelian Model of Defining Science %J History of Philasophy %I Iranian Society of History of Philosophy %Z 2008-9589 %A Mehdi Nazemi Ardakani %A Hamed Mustafawi Fard %D 1393 %\ 1393/03/31 %V 2 %N 5 %P 1-10 %! Aristotelian Model of Defining Science %K model of defining science Aristotle thematic distinction exact sciences mentally-posited sciences %X Thematic distinction is the oldest method of distinguishing sciences from each other, so that some believe that it is the only method used for this purpose. Taftazani and Lahiji claim that mutikallimun are unanimous that different sciences can be essentially distinguished from each other based on their subject matters. Accordingly, they believe that the distinctions among sciences arise from the distinctions among their subjects, and by attaining aspects, they mean the aspects of the subject’s preparedness for accepting the predicate. However, in a more accurate sense, philosophers argue that, in the field of exact and demonstrative sciences, what consolidates the unity of a science is its subject matter. In the same way, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i explicitly states that the distinction criterion for exact and demonstrative sciences in their subject, and for mentally-posited sciences it is their end and purpose. In contrast, in the view of the critics of the model of “thematic distinction of sciences”, research findings indicate that sciences consist of a few propositions that have been completed over time. Therefore, their subjects were not even known to their founders and, that is why they were not capable of discussing their states. They argue that, even if we accept the Aristotelian model, we should say that many of the debates regarding the distinctions among sciences originate in confusing exact and mentally-posited sciences with each other and generalizing the principles of exact sciences to mentally-posited ones. %U http://rimag.ir/fa/Article/23228